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Abstract
When bidders are not substitutes, we show that there is no standard ascend-
ing auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium under
truthful bidding. Such an impossibility holds also in environments where the
Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff and is thus stronger
than de Vries, Schummer and Vohra’s [On ascending Vickrey auctions for het-
erogeneous objects, J. Econ. Theory, 132, 95-118] impossibility result with
regards to the Vickrey payoff vector under general valuations. Similarly to
Mishra and Parkes [Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, J.
Econ. Theory, 132, 335-366], the impossibility can be circumvented by giving
price discounts to the bidders from the final vector of prices. Nevertheless, the
similarity is misleading: the solution we propose satisfies a minimality infor-
mation revelation property that fails to be satisfied in any ascending auction
that implements the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We investigate
related issues when strictly positive increments have to be used under general
continuous valuations.
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1 Introduction
In the same way as the English auction has desirable features compared to the
second price auction, its sealed-bid counterpart, developing ascending counterparts
of sealed-bid formats is of primer interest in the multi-object auction literature. A
main issue in sealed-bid formats as the Vickrey auction where bidders are invited
to reveal directly their preferences truthfully is their reluctance to disclose such an
information that can have adverse effects in future interactions or if the auctioneer
may cheat (see Rothkopf et al. [41]’s formalization and Moldovanu and Tietzel [36]’s
historical example). A completely different argument in favor of ascending formats
comes from the possibility for bidders to refine their valuations during the auction
process as developed in Compte and Jehiel [8, 9]. Their argument seems especially
relevant in those ascending formats, as the FCC spectrum auctions, that last several
weeks or even months and where heterogenous goods are sold such that bidders have
to decide on which bundle to acquire information.1 Similarly, bidders’ willingness to
pay are endogenous with allocative externalities and ascending formats allow them
to refine their beliefs about their relevant competitors. With some structure on
the externality terms, Das Varma [12] shows that the English auction reveals more
payoff-relevant information compared to standard sealed bid formats and raises thus
a greater revenue. For the sale of a good with interdependent values and asymmetric
bidders, Krishna [26] and Dubra et al. [16] establish the existence of an efficient
ex post equilibrium under some mild assumptions while inefficiency would prevail
in the second price auction if there are strictly more than two bidders. Finally, the
‘Linkage Principle’ developed by Milgrom and Weber [33] for single unit auctions
would intuitively plead in favor of ascending multi-object formats in environments
with interdependent valuations and correlated private signals.2
Under unit-demand, Demange et al. [15] consider an ascending auction with
linear and anonymous prices that implements bidders’ most preferred competitive
equilibrium, which coincides with the Vickrey payoff vector as established by Leonard
[30], and thus the efficient assignment in an incentive compatible way. When bid-
1On similar grounds, Ye [42] argues in favor of a multi-stage auction that leaves room for
information acquisition in the middle of the auction process.
2See Ausubel [2] for an extension of the linkage principle to multi-unit environments with flat
multi-demand. Note however that Perry and Reny [38] display an example where the linkage
principle fails in a multi-unit auction.
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ders are satisfying the gross substitutes condition, Gul and Stacchetti [22] generalize
Demange et al. [15]: their ascending auction implements bidders’ most preferred
competitive equilibrium beyond the unit-demand framework. However, such an out-
come may not coincide with the Vickrey payoffs. Gul and Stacchetti [22] actually
establish the impossibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs through an ascending
auction with linear and anonymous prices, even if bidders’ preferences are satisfying
the gross substitutes condition. However, the impossibility result is circumvented if
non-linear and non-anonymous pricing is allowed as established by de Vries et al.
[14] by using the primal-dual (PD) algorithm of a linear programming formulation
of the efficient assignment problem developed previously by Bikhchandani and Os-
troy [5]. Their ascending auction implements a point in the set of bidder-optimal
competitive equilibrium payoffs when bidders are substitutes. In such a case, this
set is a singleton and coincides with the Vickrey payoff vector.3 However, de Vries
et al. [14] show that the impossibility reappears when at least one bidder has a
valuation function that does not satisfy the gross substitutes condition. Following
the combinatorial auction literature, we consider from now on “classes” of auctions
that allow non-linear and non-anonymous pricing systems. In this vein, we use the
terminology ‘competitive equilibrium’ with regards to such general pricing systems.4
The starting point of the paper is an impossibility result faced by standard as-
cending auctions defined in the same way as in de Vries et al. [14]: no standard
ascending auction yields a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium payoff (or equiv-
alently a bidder-optimal Core payoff) under truthful bidding for general valuations.
Furthermore, the impossibility still holds under a restricted set of preferences such
that the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff vector and thus
coincides with the set -which is then a singleton- of bidder-optimal competitive equi-
librium payoffs. As a by-product, note that we fill a gap with respect to de Vries et
al. [14]’s analysis of the implementation of the Vickrey payoff vector: when bidders
are substitutes, the Vickrey payoff vector, which is then a bidder-optimal competitive
equilibrium payoff vector, can be implemented with a standard ascending auction.
On the contrary, if some bidders have complementary preferences, de Vries et al. [14]
3The seemingly contradiction with Gul and Stacchetti [22] (where bidders are substitutes since
each bidder satisfies the gross substitutes condition) is that the latter consider bidders’ most pre-
ferred competitive equilibrium with respect to the set of linear and anonymous price vectors and
not the set of non-linear and non-anonymous price vector as in de Vries et al. [14].
4See the recent collection of papers in Cramton et al. [10].
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build an example with a class of preferences where the Vickrey payoff vector is not
a competitive equilibrium and which prevents the possibility to implement it with
some standard ascending auction. Here we obtain that the Vickrey payoff vector
being for sure a competitive equilibrium is not a sufficient condition to implement
it through a standard ascending auction. This result comes from an intuition that
already appeared as a comment in de Vries et al. [14]: “since the early rounds of a
PD auction may force a bidder to compete against only a subset of other bidders
[...], complementarities between that subset may drive prices too high. Intuitively, if
the “wrong” subset of bidders is chosen to compete with itself, then prices on some
bundles could be driven too high. In that case, VCG payments could not be reached
monotonically” (p108). In other words, this means that prices may be pushed in
an inappropriate way such that a bidder may obtain less than the minimum of his
bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium payoffs. Since this intuition has not been for-
malized previously, it is carefully illustrated through a simple example in section 3
under a standard ascending format that corresponds to a subgradient algorithm with
respect to Bikhchandani and Ostroy [5]’s formulation, as in Ausubel and Milgrom
[4] and Parkes [37]. Proposition 4.1 then formalizes that such an intuition prevails
in any standard ascending auction.
In a second step, we propose to add a price discount stage from the final vector
of prices in order to circumvent our previous impossibility result. The idea of price
discounts has been first introduced by Mishra and Parkes [34] to circumvent the
impossibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs in an ascending way with general
valuations. Price discounts per se do not break the desirable features of ascending
formats that have been gathered in the first paragraph. Nevertheless, coupled with
the general definition of ascending auctions considered in de Vries et al. [14] and also
here, price discounts are allowing an implementation of the Vickrey payoffs which
breaks the analogy with the English auction: first recover fully bidders’ preferences
by raising the prices and then implement the Vickrey payoffs with price discounts.
Mishra and Parkes [34]’s proposal is less extreme than this stylized auction (however
it may coincide with it in some generic cases) but still relies on the unappealing
feature that the auctioneer may still raise the prices after a competitive equilibrium
has been reached. At this stage when the final assignment is thus fixed in an efficient
auction, the final payoff of a given bidder in Mishra and Parkes [34]’s Vickrey auction
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will not depend anymore on his own further reports but only on the further reports
of his opponents. Consequently, once a competitive equilibrium has been reached,
bidders are then indifferent between all possible reports.5 Due to such an indifference
and according to Rothkopf et al. [41]’s perspective of bidders’ reluctance to reveal
their true preferences, the incentives to report truthfully additional parts from their
own preferences does not seem satisfactory. More generally, the price dynamic of
an ascending auction according to Mishra and Parkes [34]’s definition may raise the
price of provisionally winning bids. This invites us to reconsider what should be
taken as an ascending auction by introducing a minimality property requiring that
only the prices of provisional losing bidders according to the current set of bids can
be raised. We show that the impossibility to implement a bidder-optimal competitive
equilibrium with a standard ascending auction is circumvented with some minimal
ascending auctions: contrary to the former, our solutions involve price discounts
after the price dynamic has stopped. Since they satisfy the minimality property, our
solutions have thus a completely different nature than Mishra and Parkes [34]’s.
Furthermore, we move in a third step to the issue of the implementation of the
Vickrey payoff vector with a minimal ascending auction. On the one hand and as
a by-product of our analysis of the implementation of a bidder-optimal competitive
equilibrium, we obtain that if the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium
payoff, then there exists ascending auctions (with price discounts) that implement
it under truthful bidding. On the other hand, under general valuations, we extend
de Vries et al. [14]’s impossibility result to minimal ascending auctions with price
discounts. The failure of the minimality property is thus not specific to Mishra and
Parkes [34]’s proposal but would prevail in any ascending auction that implements
the Vickrey payoffs.
Up to this stage, the analysis has been mainly limited to environments with
integer valuations. Finally, we move to more general environments with continuous
valuations and investigate the robustness of our analysis to the introduction of a
5This unappealing feature has not been pointed by Mishra and Parkes [34] and is a corollary
of the foundation of the Vickrey payoff for a given bidder that depends solely on the externality
imposed on his opponents which does not depend anymore on his own preferences once the final
efficient assignment for the entire coalition of bidders has been found. A similar unappealing feature
occurs in Mishra and Parkes [35]’s descending Vickrey auctions once a competitive equilibrium of
the main economy has been found and also in Ausubel [3]’s dynamic auction with multiple parallel
auctions, e.g. once the Vickrey payoff of some bidders has been computed. In the same vein, Jehiel
and Moldovanu [24] pointed a similar unappealing indifference in Mezzetti [31]’s efficient mechanism
with interdependent valuations.
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discrepancy between valuations and bid increments such that the price dynamic can
not match exactly the indifference curves: we show that, under truthful bidding,
no standard ascending auction with positive increments can guarantee to yield an
assignment that generates a welfare as close as possible to the efficient assignment for
any profile of valuations, however small the increment can be. The intuition is similar
than the one that sustains our first impossibility result: a bidder may exit the auction
though his contribution to the total welfare is not of the same order as the bidding
increment. This impossibility stands in contrast with both Demange et al. [15] and
Milgrom [32] who have shown in their respective auction models where bidders have
substitutes preferences that bid increments add only a nuisance term that vanishes
when the increments go to zero. The non-robustness to positive increments is then
circumvented by means of price discounts of the size of the increments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the no-
tation. Section 3 gives a simple example which illustrates a crucial underlying in-
tuition in our subsequent analysis. Section 4 considers the implementation of a
bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium. Section 5 revisits the implementation of
the Vickrey payoff vector: de Vries et al. [14]’s impossibility result is extended to
minimal ascending auctions with price discounts. Section 6 investigates the robust-
ness of ascending auctions to increments and discusses the consequences for practical
auction design. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated in Appendices A-J.
2 The package model
2.1 The assignment problem
There is a finite set of bidders N = {1 . . . , N}, a single seller indexed as agent 0
and a finite set of indivisible goods G. The set of feasible assignments of the goods
is denoted as follows:
A = {A ∈ (2G)N+1 : i 6= j ⇒ Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ and
N⋃
i=0
Ai = G}.
Each bidder i ∈ N has a non-negative valuation for each set of goods H ⊆ G,
denoted by vi,H , and with vi,∅ = 0. We assume that vi,. is nondecreasing for any
i ∈ N , i.e. H ⊆ H ′ implies vi,H ≤ vi,H′ . Preferences are quasi-linear: a bidder i who
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consumes H ⊆ G and makes a payment of pi,H ∈ R+, which denotes the price of
bundle H to bidder i, receives a net payoff of vi,H − pi,H .6 For a given assignment
A, the welfare equals then ∑i∈N vi,Ai . The demand set of bidder i at price vector
p ∈ R2G×N+ and the supply set of the seller to a subset S ⊆ N of bidders are defined
respectively as follows:
Di(p; v) := Argmax
H⊆G
vi,H − pi,H .
LS(p) := ArgmaxA∈A
∑
i∈S
pi,Ai .
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Price vector p and assignment A are a
competitive equilibrium (CE) of economy E(S), for some S ⊆ N , if Ai ∈ Di(p; v)
for every bidder i ∈ S and A ∈ LS(p). Price p is called a CE price vector of economy
E(S).
For a given price vector p ∈ R2G×N+ of economy E(N ), let γ(p) ∈ RN+1+ denote
the corresponding payoff vector such that γ0(p) = maxA∈A
∑
i∈N pi,Ai and γi(p) =
maxH⊆G vi,H − pi,H for i ∈ N . If p is a CE price vector then γ(p) is called a CE
payoff (of economy E(N )). In the following, let CEP (N , v) denote the set of CE
payoffs.
Definition 2 The set of bidder-optimal CE payoffs [respectively of weak bidder-
optimal CE payoffs] is the set containing the elements γ ∈ CEP (N , v) such that
there exists no CE payoff γ′ ∈ CEP (N , v) with γ′i ≥ γi for all i ∈ N and such that
at least one inequality is strict [respectively with γ′i > γi for all i ∈ N ].
In the following, those sets are respectively denoted byBOCE(N , v) and wBOCE(N , v).
A bidder-optimal CE price vector is a CE price vector p ∈ R2G×N+ such that γ(p) is
a bidder-optimal CE payoff.
We consider the characteristic function associated to this assignment problem
which is defined by w(S) := maxA∈A
∑
i∈S vi,Ai for any S ⊆ N .
6Our analysis can be extended to the generalized framework where bidders have general valuation
functions vi,A for the entire assignment A ∈ A, with the restriction that vi,A = 0 if Ai = ∅, i.e.
allowing for allocative externalities between purchasers but no externalities on non-traders as in
Lamy [28]. With respect to the present analysis, the price vector would have to be enriched to allow
for contingent prices that do not depend solely on H ⊆ G but on the whole assignment A ∈ A.
7
Definition 3 We say that bidders are substitutes if the characteristic function w is
submodular, i.e. if for allM ⊆M ′ ⊆ N and all j ∈ N we have w(M∪{j})−w(M) ≥
w(M ′ ∪ {j})− w(M ′).
A key payoff vector is the Vickrey payoff vector, denoted by γV := (γVi )i∈N∪{0},
such that bidder i’s payoff γVi equals w(N )− w(N \ {i}) and the seller receives the
revenue γV0 = w(N )−
∑
l∈N γ
V
l . Then we define the set of Core payoffs, denoted by
Core(N , v), related to this characteristic function w:
Core(N , v) =
(γi)i∈N∪{0} ∈ RN+1+ | (a) : ∑
i∈N∪{0}
γi = w(N ); (b) : (∀S ⊆ N ) w(S) ≤
∑
i∈S∪{0}
γi
 .
(a) is the feasibility condition meaning that a Core payoff vector implements an
efficient assignment, i.e. an assignment A ∈ ArgmaxA∈A
∑
i∈N vi,Ai , whereas the
inequalities (b) mean that the payoffs are not blocked by any coalition S.7
Remark 2.1 The payoff vector resulting from a positive transfer of payoffs from
a given bidder i to the seller remains in the Core if the initial payoff vector is in
the Core and provided that γi remains nonnegative. This comes from the fact that
the inequalities (b) are not altered if i ∈ S and that the inequalities (b) are only
strengthened if i /∈ S. In particular, the payoff vector such that γ0 = w(N ) and
γi = 0 for all i ∈ N belongs to the Core which is thus non empty. As a corollary
of the following proposition we obtain that the set of CE payoffs is non-empty and
thus also the set BOCE(N , v).
Proposition 2.1 (Bikhchandani and Ostroy [5])
• Core(N , v) = CEP (N , v)
• The Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff vector if and only
if the bidder-optimal frontier is a singleton. In such a case they coincide:
BOCE(N , v) = {γV }.
• If bidders are substitutes, then for any set of bidders M ⊆ N we have w(N )−
w(N \M) ≥ ∑j∈M [w(N )− w(N \ {j})]. This latter condition is equivalent
to the Vickrey payoff vector being a competitive equilibrium payoff vector.
7We assume implicitly that the seller is present in any coalition.
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From proposition 2.1, the set BOCE(N , v) is also called the bidder-optimal fron-
tier of the Core. A crucial condition in the analysis of ascending auctions is whether
the Vickrey payoff vector is a CE payoff vector. This is thus equivalent to the fact
that the bidder-optimal frontier a singleton and closely related to the slightly stronger
‘bidders are substitutes’ condition.
The bulk of our analysis consists in implementing exactly either a payoff vector
that belongs to the set BOCE(N , v) or the Vickrey payoff vector. In some circum-
stances, we are considering an approximate implementation perspective instead of
an exact one. To this aim, we consider the following definition.
Definition 4 A vector x ∈ Rm is said to -approximate a set K ⊂ Rm if there is a
vector y ∈ K such that |xi − yi| ≤  for any i = 1, . . . ,m.
2.2 Ascending auctions
For our impossibility results we mainly consider the class of standard ascend-
ing auctions introduced by de Vries et al. [14]. First this class imposes that price
adjustments are driven solely through demand revelation. Second it imposes a full
linkage between final prices and final monetary transfers on the contrary to Gul and
Stacchetti [22]’s analysis: prices in the auction are thus not artificial constructs. Fur-
thermore, we also introduce two additional ingredients with respect to their model:
price increments and the possibility of a price discount stage after the auction dy-
namic ends which relax the linkage between final prices and final monetary transfers.
Definition 5 A price path is a function P : [0, 1] → R2G×N+ . For each bundle of
goods H ⊆ G, interpret Pi,H(t) to be the price seen by bidder i for bundle H, at
“time” t. A price path is ascending if for any i ∈ N and H ⊆ G the function Pi,H(t)
is nondecreasing in t. A price path involves -increments (with  ≥ 0) if for any
t, t′ ∈ [0, 1] either Pi,H(t) = Pi,H(t′) or |Pi,H(t)− Pi,H(t′)| ≥ . Let Π denote the set
of all ascending price paths with -increments.
We say that a price path (or abusively a pricing system or an auction) is anony-
mous if Pi,H(t) = Pj,H(t) for any i, j ∈ N and H ⊆ G, linear if Pi,H1(t) + Pi,H2(t) =
Pi,H1∪H2(t) for any i ∈ N and H1, H2 ⊆ G with H1 ∩ H2 = ∅ and combinatorial
otherwise. Note that the English button auction is anonymous. However, a typical
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English auction with increments fails to be anonymous according to our terminology:
the provisional winning bidder is not facing the same price as the provisional losing
bidders who have to bid the winning price plus a positive increment in order to stay
active.
Definition 6 A standard ascending auction [respectively an ascending auction with
price discounts ] with -increments is a pair of functions pi : R2G×N+ → Π and
ξ : R2G×N+ → RN+ ×A such that:
(i) for all valuation profiles v, v′ ∈ R2G×N+ , if Di(pi(v)[t]; v) = Di(pi(v′)[t]; v′) for any
t ∈ [0, t∗] and i ∈ N , then pi(v) = pi(v′) on [0, t∗].
(ii) the final assignment A = ξ2(v) satisfies demand according to the final prices
pi(v)[1], i.e. Ai ∈ Di(pi(v)[1]; v) for any v ∈ R2G×N+ , and the price [ξ1(v)]i =
[pi(v)[1]]i,Ai is charged to bidder i [respectively (ii) there exists a discount func-
tion δ : R2G×N+ → R2
G×N
+ such that for all valuation profiles v, v′ ∈ R2
G×N
+ , if
Di(pi(v)[t]; v) = Di(pi(v
′)[t]; v′) for any t ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ N , then δ(v) = δ(v′)
and [δ(v)]i,H ≤ [pi(v)[1]]i,H for any H ⊆ G and i ∈ N , the final assignment A = ξ2(v)
satisfies demand according to the final discounted prices, i.e. Ai ∈ Di([δ(v)]i; v) for
any v ∈ R2G×N+ and the price [δ(v)]i,Ai is charged to bidder i].
The property (i) guarantees that the price vector is rising and so information
is revealed only through demand revelation in the auction. In the same way, the
discount function in an ascending auction with price discounts is defined such that it
depends solely on the demand revelation history and the ascending price path that
is associated to the auction. For our positive results, the discount function we use
is actually much simpler than what our definition is allowing since it uses only the
final vector of prices pi(v)[1] and the corresponding demand sets (Di(pi(v)[1]; v))i∈N .8
The class of ascending auctions with price discounts is a superset of the class
of standard ascending auctions and is then mentioned briefly as ascending auctions.
The idea of a price discount stage has been first introduced by Mishra and Parkes
[34].9 Nevertheless, to implement the Vickrey payoff vector, an additional element
8If we have in mind that bidders may refine their valuations in the course of the auction process,
this last property seems desirable. Otherwise, it would allow the price discounts to depend on
out-of-date information about bidders’ demand.
9The ‘clinching rule’ in Ausubel [2, 3] is implicitly a price discount stage. In those papers the
emphasis is on ‘simple’ dynamic auction mechanisms rather than on the ascending status of those
auctions which belong to our class of ascending auctions. The ‘clinching rule’ corresponds to a
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of departure with respect to the usual ascending auctions proposed in the literature
to generalize the English auction is also implicitly used: once a competitive equilib-
rium has been found the auction dynamic does not stop. Mishra and Parkes [34]’s
analysis relies crucially on the research of a stronger equilibrium concept, universal
competitive equilibrium, that will be briefly discussed at the end of section 4. As
emphasized in the introduction, the idea of price discounts per se does not neces-
sarily stand in conflict with the desirable features that sustain our interest in the
development of ‘ascending auction’ formats. However, without additional restric-
tions, it opens the door to solutions that almost mimic -from a pure private value
perspective- the sealed-bid generalized Vickrey auction as the one where bidders are
asked to report their full demand through ascending price adjustments that are not
linked to the entire demand revelation from all bidders. The following minimality
property formalizes the need to strengthen the linkage between bidders’ demand rev-
elation and price adjustments. As a preliminary, we define for a given price vector
p ∈ R2G×N+ :
L∗S(p) := Arg maxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p;v)},i∈S
∑
i∈S
pi,Ai
to denote the set of the revenue maximizing assignments for the seller in economy
E(S), S ⊆ N , among those that assign to every bidder either a bundle from his
demand set or the ∅ bundle at price vector p.
The central requirement of the minimality property is that the vector of prices
for a given bidder i is raised at some price vector p only if there is an assignment
A ∈ L∗N (p) such that bidder i’s demand is not satisfied. A bidder such that Ai ∈
Di(p; v) for any A ∈ L∗N (p) is called a provisionally winning bidder. In other words,
we impose a mild linkage between price shifts and bidders’ demand: the price vector
of a provisionally winning bidder can not be pushed up. In particular, it means that
bidder i’s price vector is frozen once the empty set belongs to his demand set.
Definition 7 An ascending auction (pi, ξ) is minimal if for any v ∈ R2G×N+ , the price
path P = pi(v) satisfies:
discount function that depends not solely on the final price vector, as in Mishra and Parkes [34]
and in the auctions we will consider next, but on the whole price path. See also Bikhchandani
and Ostroy [6] for an interpretation of Ausubel [2]’s ascending auction for multiple units of a
homogeneous object in term of a primal-dual algorithm with respect to Bikhchandani and Ostroy
[5]’s linear programming formulation.
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• Pi,∅(t) = 0 for any i ∈ N and t ∈ [0, 1],10
• if Pi,H(t) 6= Pi,H(t′) for some H ⊆ G, i ∈ N and t′ > t then there exists
t∗ ∈ [t, t′) and A ∈ L∗N (P (t∗)) such that Ai /∈ Di(P (t∗); v),
• if H ⊆ H ′, then Pi,H(t) ≤ Pi,H′(t) for any t ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ N .
When there is a unique good for sale, the price path of a minimal ascending
auction reduces to a current price for each bidder that is raising over time. The
minimality property requires that if a given bidder demands the good at time t at a
price that is strictly the highest among the current vector of prices, then this price is
not rising at time t. This property is satisfied in all practical versions of the English
auction to the best of our knowledge.
Ascending auction in the literature
First, the ascending auctions we consider seem -at first glance- to be limited
to what is called a ‘clock auction’ in the literature, i.e. auctions where it is not
the bidders but the auctioneer that raises the prices according to bidders’ reported
demand sets. Nevertheless, auctions where it is on the contrary the bidders that
update their bids as in the simultaneous ascending auction in Milgrom [32], in the
package auction in Ausubel and Milgrom [4] or in the hierarchical package bidding in
Goeree and Holt [21] can be reframed to fit in our class of ascending auctions when
we limit ourselves to appropriate ‘straightforward strategies’. As an example, let
us consider Milgrom [32]’s simultaneous ascending auction under his straightforward
bidding rule. It corresponds to the following algorithm: start from null prices and
then apply the following price dynamic until it stops and where winning bidders pay
then their final personalized prices: for any bidder i ∈ N , pick D∗i (t) ∈ Di(P (t), v),
consider a vector of winning prices (p1(t), . . . , p|G|(t)) where for each good g ∈ G,
we have pg(t) := maxi∈N|g∈D∗i (t) Pi,g(t), select for each good g a provisional winning
bidder, denoted by wg(t), that belongs to Argmaxi∈N|g∈D∗i (t) Pi,g(t) and then raise
the price in the next bidding round (at time t + ∆t) in the following way Pi,g(t +
∆t) := Pi,g(t) if i = wg(t), otherwise let Pi,g(t + ∆t) := pg(t) + .11 Thus Milgrom
[32]’s simultaneous ascending auction can be viewed as a standard ascending auction
10We allow that Pi,H(0) > 0 if H 6= ∅, i.e. we allow minimal opening bids.
11Milgrom [32] considers multiplicative instead of additive bidding increments. This detail is
innocuous.
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according to our terminology. In a similar way, Ausubel and Milgrom [4] and Goeree
and Holt [21]’s combinatorial auctions can be viewed as ascending auctions with price
discounts: contrary to the linear auction in Milgrom [32], the personalized price for
a given bundle H ⊆ G and for a given bidder i may rise such that it does not belong
anymore to bidder i’s demand set while the seller would maximize her revenue by
assigning the bundle H to bidder i at its current price minus the increment, i.e.
such that it belongs to bidder i’s demand set after a price discount of the bidding
increment on the given bundle H. The need for -discounts, where  is the size of
the increments between each bids in the auction dynamic, or equivalently the need
to take into account all previously submitted bids is developed in section 6.
On the whole, we emphasize the strength of our impossibility results since al-
most all auctions that appeared in the literature under the terminology ‘ascending
auctions’ belong to our general class of ascending auctions. We are aware of only
two exceptions: Ausubel [3]’s dynamic auction for heterogenous goods with multiple
parallel auctions in order to implement the Vickrey payoff vector under substitutable
preferences while maintaining linear pricing or Perry and Reny [39]’s dynamic auc-
tion for homogenous goods under interdependent valuations in order to implement
an efficient assignment.12
Second, the only ascending auctions in the literature that fail to be minimal, to
the best of our knowledge, are the ones proposed by Mishra and Parkes [34]. At
first glance, the anonymous and linear auctions in Demange et al. [15] and Gul and
Stacchetti [22] fail to be minimal since a provisionally winning bidder can face a
price increase: this is purely a framing effect, those auctions can be defined alterna-
tively without modifying the final outcome under truthful reporting and such that
they remain minimal (but such that their pricing system is no longer anonymous).
We do not incorporate the minimality property in the definition of an ascending
auction for clarification purposes. However, it is precisely our aim to analyze what
can be implemented under (standard) ascending auctions that are minimal. In this
perspective, we emphasize that the formats we use in our possibility results, i.e. the
12In the same way as price discounts per se do not stand in conflict with what should be viewed as
an ascending auction, we should not dispose a priori of the idea of multiple price pathes. However,
it may stand in conflict with what we have captured under the minimality property defined for
ascending auctions with a single price path: if a bidder is provisionally a winning bidder then we
should not ask him further information on his preferences. See also footnote 5. Such developments
are left for further research.
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QCE-invariant ascending auctions defined below and their variants introduced later,
are all minimal.
Definition 8 Price vector p and assignment A are a quasi-CE of economy E(S),
for some S ⊆ N , if Ai ∈ Di(p; v) for every bidder i ∈ S and A ∈ L∗S(p). Price p is
called a quasi-CE price vector of economy E(S).
Contrary to CE price vectors, an assignment that corresponds to a quasi-CE price
vector is not necessarily efficient. For any quasi-CE price vector p, let γ(p) denote
the corresponding payoff vector that is defined analogously to the corresponding
definition for a CE: γ0(p) = maxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p;v)},i∈S
∑
i∈S pi,Ai and γi(p) = γi(p) for
any i ∈ N .
For our various existence results of an appropriate ascending auction we con-
sider variations from the following class of QCE-invariant ascending auctions with
-increments: at each stage, bidders are asked to report their demand sets for the
current price vector, the seller chooses an assignment that maximizes her revenue
according to those demand sets, then for bidders that do not obtain an assignment
in their demand set the corresponding prices are increased by the increment , if all
bidders receive an assignment in their demand set then the auction stops and the
current price vector is used for pricing the goods.
Definition 9 A QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments ( > 0) is de-
fined as follows:
(S0) The auction starts at the zero price vector.
(S1) In round t of the auction, with price vector pt:
(S1.1) Collect the demand sets of the bidders at price vector pt
(S1.2) If pt is a quasi-CE price vector with respect to reported demand sets, then
go to Step S2 with T := t.
(S1.3) Else, select a temporary winning assignment At ∈ L∗N (pt) and a (non-
empty) set of temporary losers Lt ⊂ N such that Ati /∈ Di(pt; v) for any i ∈ Lt who
will see a price increase.13
(S1.4) If i ∈ Lt and H ∈ Di(pt; v), then pt+1i,H := pti,H + . Else, pt+1i,H := pti,H .
Repeat from Step (S1.1).
13This set is not empty. Otherwise, pt would be a quasi-CE price vector and the algorithm would
have stopped in the previous stage (S1.2).
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(S2) The auction ends with the final assignment of the auction being any AT ∈
L∗N (p
T ) and the final payment of every bidder i ∈ N being pT
i,ATi
, where pT is the
final price vector of the auction.
The construction guarantees that any QCE-invariant ascending auction is a stan-
dard ascending auction.14 Let kti denote the optimal profit that bidder i can expect
at round t, i.e. kti := maxH⊆G {vi,H − pti,H}. The ascending nature of the auction
guarantees that kti is nonincreasing in t.
If valuations are integers, then QCE-invariant ascending auctions with unit in-
crements belong to the class of “uQCE-invariant(0) auction for the main economy”
considered by Mishra and Parkes [34]. However, the other inclusion fails. First, the
set of bidders that may face a price increase is reduced in our definition to those
bidders that may be temporary losers, while Mishra and Parkes [34] are allowing any
price increase for a given bidder provided that the empty set is not in his demand
set. This is precisely the reason why our auctions are minimal contrary to those
in Mishra and Parkes [34]. Second, Step (S1.2) in Mishra and Parkes [34] is more
restrictive since it requires that pt is a CE price vector with respect to reported de-
mand sets instead of the weaker notion of quasi-CE. If valuations are integers and
with unit increments -more generally if the valuations’ and increments’ grids fit- as
it will be considered in sections 4 and 5, the two equilibrium notions would coincide
in such auctions as a corollary of our subsequent lemma 2.3. However, in general
it is not the case. The reason why we use the quasi-CE notion instead of the CE
notion in our definition is that there is no guarantee with the latter notion that the
algorithm in definition 9 would end. On the contrary, the algorithm in definition 9
and its variants end in a finite number of rounds since prices are strictly increasing
from one round to the next such that the demand set of all bidders would be reduced
to the empty bundle after a finite number of rounds if the algorithm does not stop.
This would raise a contradiction since the algorithm would then stop immediately.
If the empty bundle is in one given bidder’s demand set then we will call such
a bidder an inactive bidder. In a QCE-invariant auction, his prices remain fixed
and his demand set is thus unchanged such that his inactive status is fixed until the
end of the auction’s dynamic. On the contrary, a bidder whose demand set contains
14Up to some additional notation, the structure with countable “rounds” can equivalently be
reframed in the framework with a price path on the interval [0, 1].
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solely non-empty bundles is called an active bidder.
Lemma 2.1 Consider a QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments at a
given round t. There are two kinds of assignments for a given bidder i ∈ N :
• Type 1: pti,Ai = 0 and vi,Ai − pti,Ai ≤ kti.
• Type 2: pti,Ai > 0 and kti −  < vi,Ai − pti,Ai ≤ kti.
Definition 10 A price vector p is semi-truthful if pi,H > 0⇒ H ∈ Di(p; v), for any
i ∈ N and H ⊆ G.
An alternative equivalent definition is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 A price vector p is semi-truthful if and only if for any i ∈ N there
exists a unique ki ∈ [0, vi,G] such that p is characterized by pi,H = max {vi,H − ki, 0}.
Furthermore ki = γi(p).
For any i ∈ N and H ∈ Di(p; v), any price vector satisfies pi,H = vi,H − γi(p).
If p is semi-truthful, then for any H /∈ Di(p; v), we have pi,H = 0, which shows the
necessary part. The sufficient part is straightforward.
Under integer valuations and with unit increments, we obtain from lemma 2.1
the equalities kti = vi,Ai−pti,Ai for any assignment with pti,Ai > 0, i.e. the price vector
is semi-truthful along the price path, and then the following lemma guarantees that
QCE-invariant auctions are implementing CE payoffs under truthful reporting.
Lemma 2.3 If a price vector p is a quasi-CE and is semi-truthful, then p is a CE.
In other words, we have
max
A∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p;v)}
∑
i∈N
pi,Ai = maxA∈A
∑
i∈N
pi,Ai . (1)
Remark 2.2 In order to prove the inclusion Core(N , v) ⊆ CEP (N , v) (proposition
2.1), Bikhchandani and Ostroy [5] have shown that any point γ in the Core can be
priced by a semi-truthful CE. More precisely, they consider the semi-truthful price
vector defined in the following way: pi,H := max {vi,H − γi, 0} for any i ∈ N and
H ⊆ G. In the following, this vector is denoted by P(γ). for any γ ∈ RN+ .
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Definition 11 An ascending auction is incentive compatible on a domain V if truth-
ful reporting (with respect to demand sets) at each “time” t ∈ [0, 1] by all bidders is
a (complete information) equilibrium for any realization v ∈ V .
Incentive compatibility on a domain V means also that if all opponents are bid-
ding truthfully then it is a dominant strategy to bid truthfully.
Apart from section 6, our analysis does not impose the use of strictly positive
increments. For simplification purposes, this part of the analysis is then limited to
environments with integer valuations. For our possibility results the aim is to avoid
the technicalities related to introduction of ascending auctions without increments.
With a single good for sale, the simplest minimal ascending auction without incre-
ments is the English button auction where bidders can exit the auction at any time
while the price rises continuously and stops at the time where at least all bidders ex-
cept one have exited the auction. With multiple goods, the continuous time versions
of the auction we propose are straightforward but tedious to define. For our following
impossibility results, they hold when bidders are restricted to integer valuations and
hold thus a fortiori with general (continuous) valuations.
3 An illustrative example
In one simple example with two identical goods and four bidders, we illustrate
some problematic features of standard ascending auctions. We consider more specif-
ically the QCE-invariant ascending auction with unit increments where, in case of
ties at some time t, the temporary winning assignment At is the assignment which
assigns the greatest number of units to bidders with the highest indices while the
maximal set of temporary losers is chosen. Table 1 details the progress of the auc-
tion. The bundles which have prices in (.) are in the demand set of the respective
bidders. We put emphasis on the auction dynamic since it is instructive with regards
to the intuition of our impossibility results in propositions 4.1 and 6.1: at the earliest
stages of the auction, prices may be pushed in an inappropriate direction.
We consider that bidder 1 is valuing 10 the first item and 0 an additional item,
bidder 2 and 3 are identical and are valuing any additional item 4. For the moment,
preferences are satisfying the gross substitutes condition. Let us introduce an ad-
ditional bidder 4 who has complement preferences: he values the bundle of the two
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items 7, but values 0 a single item. Note also that bidder 4 could be labeled as a
‘dummy bidder’: he does not modify the structure of the set of CE payoffs which is
given by
CEP (N , v) = {(γ̂i)i∈N∪{0} ∈ RN+1 | γ̂0 = 14− γ̂1; γ̂1 ∈ [0, 6] ; γ̂2 = γ̂3 = γ̂4 = 0} .
The Vickrey payoff vector equals (8, 6, 0, 0, 0) which belongs to CEP (N , v). Bid-
der 4 is thus neutral from both a Vickrey or a bidder-optimal CE implementation
point of view: he does not change the final outcome which consists in assigning
the items either to the couple {1, 2} or to {1, 3} and to make pay the amount 4 to
the purchasers. If bidder 4 were absent, then we could apply Ausubel and Milgrom
[4]’s results (see also Mishra and Parkes [34] in a more general class of ascending
auctions) since all bidders would have substitutes preferences which guarantees that
the bidders are substitutes condition holds and so that the auction dynamic would
implement the Vickrey payoffs. Nevertheless, the mere presence of bidder 4 disturbs
the dynamic of the auction. The final payoff vector is no longer the Vickrey payoff
vector as shown in Table 1. The reason for this is that in early rounds the auction
forces bidder 1 to compete against bidder 4 while the preferences of bidder 2 and 3
that are revealed later in the auction dynamic imply that such high prices were not
needed for bidder 1 to block the coalition composed of bidder 4. More specifically
overbidding occurs twice in the auction: between rounds 6 and 7 and then between
rounds 10 and 11. At the end, bidder 1 has two pay two monetary units more than
according to his Vickrey payoff. Somehow clumsily, he bids above 4 because he
should internalize the externality imposed only on his opponents {4}, an externality
which is stronger than the one he imposes on the bigger set of opponents {2, 3, 4}.
This is exactly those situations that the ‘bidders are substitutes’ condition avoids by
guaranteeing that the externality terms w(S)− w(S \ {i}) are nondecreasing in S.
This undesirable feature suggests to add a stage to the QCE-invariant ascending
auction where the auctioneer reduces incrementally the bids of some bidders such
that the price vector still remains a CE. This stage will be called the final discount
stage. Given the reported demand sets at the last round in Table 1, when a CE price
vector has been reached, the seller knows that if bidder 1’s prices are reduced such
that the price for one or two items for bidder 1 equals 4 then the final price vector
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Table 1: Progress of the QCE-invariant ascending auction with unit increments
bidder 1 bidder 2 bidder 3 bidder 4
One Two One Two One Two One Two
Values → 10 10 4 8 4 8 0 7
↓ Rounds
1 (0) (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
A1: bidder 4 receives two items.
The revenue is 0. L1 = {1, 2, 3}.
2 (1) (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0)
A2: bidder 3 receives two items.
The revenue is 1. L2 = {1, 2, 4}.
3 (2) (2) 0 (2) 0 (1) 0 (1)
A3: bidder 2 receives two items.
The revenue is 2. L3 = {1, 3, 4}.
4 (3) (3) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2)
A4: bidder 1 receives two items.
The revenue is 3. L4 = {2, 3, 4}.
5 (3) (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)
A5: bidder 4 receives two items.
The revenue is 3. L5 = {1, 2, 3}.
6 (4) (4) (0) (4) (0) (4) 0 (3)
A6: bidder 3 receives two items.
The revenue is 4. L6 = {1, 2, 4}.
7 (5) (5) (1) (5) (0) (4) 0 (4)
A7: bidders 1 and 2 receive one item.
The revenue is 6. L7 = {3, 4}.
8 (5) (5) (1) (5) (1) (5) 0 (5)
A8: bidders 1 and 3 receive one item.
The revenue is 6. L8 = {2, 4}.
9 (5) (5) (2) (6) (1) (5) 0 (6)
A9: bidders 1 and 2 receive one item.
The revenue is 7. L9 = {3, 4}.
10 (5) (5) (2) (6) (2) (6) (0) (7)
A10: bidder 4 receives two items.
The revenue is 7. L10 = {1, 2, 3}.
11 (6) (6) (3) (7) (3) (7) (0) (7)
A11: bidders 1 and 3 receive one item.
The revenue is 9. L11 = {2} is unsatisfied.
12 (6) (6) (4) (8) (3) (7) (0) (7)
A12: bidders 1 and 2 receive one item.
The revenue is 10. L12 = {3} is unsatisfied.
13 (6) (6) (4) (8) (4) (8) (0) (7)
A13: bidders 1 and 3 receive one item.
The revenue is 10. A CE price vector is reached.
Final payoffs: (10, 4, 0, 0, 0) ; Vickrey payoffs: (8, 6, 0, 0, 0)
Final payoffs with infinitesimal increments: (8.75, 6.25, 0, 0, 0)
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remains a CE.15 More precisely, she knows that if bidders have bid truthfully, then
such a price vector belongs to BOCE(N , v), as it will be shown in section 4. Since
the Vickrey payoff vector is a CE payoff vector in our example, then it means that
such a price discount leads to the Vickrey payoff vector and truthful reporting is
thus an equilibrium. On the contrary, truthful reporting is not an equilibrium in the
‘original’ auction without price discounts: bidder 1 would profitably deviate from
truthful reporting by reporting that he values only slightly above 4 one or two units.
On the whole, this example illustrates that, in those QCE-invariant auctions, the
final payoff may not lie in the set of bidder-optimal CE payoffs, even if the Vickrey
payoff vector is a CE payoff vector, while adding a final discount stage restores the
implementation of the Vickrey payoffs and thus incentive compatibility. Thanks to
the price discount stage, we show more generally in section 4 that truthful reporting
is an equilibrium which leads to the single-valued bidder-optimal frontier of the
Core, hence the Vickrey payoffs, not solely under the condition that bidders are
substitutes but under the weaker condition that the Vickrey payoff vector belongs
to BOCE(N , v).
Technical remark Even if valuations are integer-valued, increments that are
smaller than 1 have an influence on the final payoffs in this example. We emphasize
that the overbidding problem in the earliest rounds of the auction is not an artifact
resulting from positive increments. In appendix C, we summarize the dynamic of
the auction in the continuous version of the auction where the increment becomes
infinitesimal. Bidder 1’s overbidding is persistent.
4 Bidder-optimal CE selecting auctions
Proposition 4.1 Under general (integer) valuations and even if the Vickrey payoff
vector is guaranteed to be a competitive equilibrium payoff vector, there is no standard
ascending auction that yields a bidder-optimal CE under truthful bidding.
We build an example with 11 different goods and 5 bidders such that:16 in the
neighborhood of the null prices, the demand sets, which are singletons, are known ex
15Note that any strict price discount for the winner among 2 and 3 would drive the final payoff
vector out of the set of CE payoffs.
16The nice feature of the example is to make the proof simple from its intrinsic symmetry between
all bidders. Similarly to Gul and Stacchetti [22]’s impossibility result, the exact number of bidders
and goods required to face the impossibility is an open question.
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ante ; however the efficient assignment is not known ex ante such that the auctioneer
has to raise strictly the prices on some bidders’ most preferred assignments to learn
about bidders’ preferences and thus to be able to implement an efficient assignment
and a fortiori a point in BOCE(N , v). Nevertheless, our construction guarantees
also that each bidder may obtain his most preferred assignment at a null price for any
point in BOCE(N , v) for some realization of the joint preferences of his opponents.
With such an example, no standard ascending auction can implement a payoff in
BOCE(N , v): if it were, then the price of some bidders should be strictly higher
than 0 for their respective most preferred assignments in order to learn about bidders’
preferences, but then the realization of bidders’ valuations could be such that those
preferences imply that the price of a given bidder who has suffered from an initial
price’s increase (on his most preferred assignments) occurs to be null, which raises a
contradiction. Such an example is built in the proof which is relegated to appendix
D.
As it is well-known, the impossibility result is circumvented when bidders are
substitutes (Ausubel and Milgrom [4], de Vries et al. [14], Mishra and Parkes [34]).
Within the class of QCE-invariant ascending auctions we also show that for general
valuations the final payoff vector corresponds ‘roughly’ to a weak bidder-optimal CE
payoff, an insight that has not been noted in those previous papers.
Proposition 4.2 Assume integer valuations and truthful bidding. For any QCE-
invariant ascending auction with unit increments, the final assignment is efficient
and the final payoff vector (kTi )i∈N 1-approximates the set of weak bidder-optimal CE
payoffs wBOCE(N , v), i.e. there exists γ ∈ wBOCE(N , v) such that |γi − kTi | ≤ 1
for any i ∈ N . Furthermore, if bidders are substitutes, then the final payoff vector
equals the Vickrey payoff vector.
We now move to the possibility result with respect to the implementation of a
bidder-optimal CE payoff under general valuations with an ascending auction by
means of an appropriate price discount function.
First we introduce some additional notation. For any vector e ∈ RN+ , let β(e; p) =
p′ denote the price vector such that p′i,H = max{pi,H − ei, 0} for any i ∈ N and
H ⊆ G. Note that if p is a semi-truthful price vector, then β(e; p) is a semi-truthful
price vector for any e ∈ RN+ .17
17Let k ∈ RN+ such that p = P(k), i.e. ki = γi(p) for any i ∈ N . For any e ∈ RN+ , we have
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Definition 12 A vector e ∈ RN+ is called an admissible discount with respect to
a quasi-CE price vector p if there exists A ∈ A such that ei ≤ pi,Ai, (p,A) is a
quasi-CE of the main economy and A ∈ ArgmaxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p;v)}
∑
i∈N [β(e; p)]i,Ai.
For any price vector p and its corresponding demand sets D = (Di(p))i∈N such
that p is a quasi-CE, let:
H(p,D) := {p′ ∈ R2G×N+ | ∃e ∈ RN+ an admissible discount with respect to p : p′ = β(e; p)}.
We emphasize that the set H(p,D) relies on bidders’ valuations only through the
demand sets D. Let Γ(p,D, v) be the corresponding set of payoff vector for a given
valuation profile v ∈ R2G×N+ , i.e. Γ(p,D; v) := {h ∈ RN+ : ∃p′ ∈ H(p,D) such that h =
γ(p′)}. Hereafter, H(p,D) and Γ(p,D; v) are respectively denoted by H(p) and Γ(p)
to alleviate notation.
Lemma 4.1 If p is a semi-truthful quasi-CE, then Γ(p) = [γ(p)]+ ∩ CEP (N , v).18
Lemma 4.1 means also that the information imbedded in a given semi-truthful
quasi-CE price vector p allows to implement all CE payoffs that are bigger (according
to bidders’ payoffs) than the payoff vector corresponding to this original CE price
vector: this is done by using all admissible discounts with respect to p. In particular,
we can implement a bidder-optimal CE payoff as it is done below with maximal
discount rules.
Definition 13 A maximal discount rule δ is a function that assigns to any quasi-
CE price vector p and its corresponding demand sets D the price vector δ(p,D) such
that:
• δ(p,D) ∈ H(p): there exists then e ∈ RN+ such that δ(p,D) = β(e; p) ∈ H(p).
• There is no e∗ ∈ RN+ such that β(e∗; p) ∈ H(p) and e∗i ≥ ei for any i ∈ N and
e∗i > ei for some i.
A maximal discount rule is thus one that selects a payoff vector that is a strict
bidder Pareto-optimum in the set Γ(p). From lemma 4.1, we obtain thus that it
selects equivalently a bidder-optimal competitive payoff.
β(e; p) = P(k + e) since max {max {vi,H − ki, 0} − ei, 0} = max {vi,H − (ki + ei), 0}.
18For some payoff vector γ = (γi)i=0,...,N ∈ RN+1, let [γ]+ := {γ′ : γ′i ≥ γi for i = 1, . . . , N}.
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Corollary 4.3 For any maximal discount rule δ, if p is a quasi-CE semi-truthful
price vector and D its corresponding demand sets, then γ(δ(p,D)) ∈ BOCE(N , v).
If [γ(p)]+ ∩ BOCE(N , v) is a singleton, then there is a unique candidate for
δ(p,D). Otherwise, there are various candidates to be a solution. According to
the desired properties on the selection rule (e.g. monotonicity), one can pick specific
solutions as investigated similarly by the literature on transferable utility cooperative
games (e.g. Arin and Inarra [1] and Dutta [17]).
We now establish the links between maximal discount rules that is the key prac-
tical innovation of the paper and the discount function that has been proposed by
Mishra and Parkes [34]. For any quasi-CE price vector p, its corresponding demand
sets D and for any i ∈ N , let ei(p,D) := maxp′∈H(p),A∈A pi,A − p′i,A. In a nutshell,
ei(p,D) corresponds to the greatest payoff increase that bidder i may expect in a
maximal discount rule from the quasi-CE p. Let e(p) = (ei(p))i=1,...,N . From any
semi-truthful CE price vector p and its corresponding demand sets D, proposition
4.4 establishes that e(p) coincides with the discount function proposed by Mishra
and Parkes [34]. Note that our construction gives a more interpretable definition of
their discount function as the largest discount for a bidder such that the price vector
remains a quasi-CE. Henceforth it is called the MP discount rule.
Proposition 4.4 Consider a quasi-CE semi-truthful price vector p.
The discount function δMP such that δMP (p,D) = β(e(p,D); p) corresponds to
the one proposed by Mishra and Parkes [34].
As a corollary, the price discounts in a maximal discount rule are smaller than
in the MP discount rule. Furthermore, bidders’ payoffs after the MP discount rule
are smaller than the Vickrey payoffs: γi(δMP (p,D)) ≤ γVi for any i ∈ N .
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We extend the class of QCE-invariant auctions to allow a price discount stage
after the auction dynamic stops.
Definition 14 A QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments and with a
maximal price discount rule [MP discount rule] δ is a QCE-invariant ascending auc-
tion with -increments with Step (S2) replaced by (S2(δ)) “The auction ends with the
final assignment of the auction being any A ∈ L∗N (δ(pT )) and the final payment of
every bidder i ∈ N being [δ(pT )]i,Ai , where pT is the final price vector of the auction
and δ is a maximal price discount rule [MP discount rule]”.
From corollary 4.3, the use of a maximal discount rule after a QCE-invariant
auction yields thus a bidder-optimal CE payoff.
Proposition 4.5 Assume integer valuations and truthful bidding. Any QCE-invariant
ascending auction with unit increments and with a maximal price discount rule im-
plements a bidder-optimal CE payoff vector.
On the contrary, this result does not hold in general with the MP discount rule. A
QCE-invariant ascending auction with unit increments and with a MP discount rule
implements a payoff vector that is bigger than the one implemented in the auction
where the MP discount rule has been replaced by a maximal price discount rule
and smaller than the Vickrey payoff vector (Proposition 4.4). See Figure 1 for an
illustration where the auctions’ acronyms are those introduced in Table 2.
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auction QCE QCE QCE uQCE
price discounts no MP max MP
acronym Sdt MP1 CSD MP2
Minimal YES NO
Incentive compatible under general preferences NO YES
Incentive compatible if Vickrey is a CE payoff NO YES
Incentive compatible if bidders are substitutes YES
Implements a CE payoff under general preferences YES NO YES NO
Table 2: Properties of the various ascending auctions
Previous ascending auctions in the literature that use combinatorial pricing sys-
tems (see Parkes [37], Ausubel and Milgrom [4] and de Vries et al. [14]) are QCE-
invariant auctions that involve no discounts and guarantee incentive compatibility
only on the domain where bidders are substitutes. On the contrary, the minimal
ascending auction with discounts presented in proposition 4.5 guarantees incentive
compatibility under the weaker condition that the Vickrey payoff vector is a com-
petitive equilibrium payoff vector. According to such a perspective the format we
propose is a strict improvement with respect to the literature while keeping the min-
imality property that captures the ascending flavor as summarized in Table 2. The
last column corresponds to the auction proposed by Mishra and Parkes [34] to im-
plement the Vickrey payoff vector under general valuations. It belongs thus to a
larger class of auctions than QCE-invariant auctions (with possibly price discounts):
it resorts to a non-minimal ascending auction. The rest of this section is devoted
to a discussion on such auctions to implement some specific bidder-optimal payoff
vectors.
4.1 Non-minimal ascending auctions
The notion of competitive equilibrium guarantees that an efficient assignment is
known. To be able to compute the Vickrey payoff point, a more stringent condition
is needed as developed in Mishra and Parkes [34] and Lahaie and Parkes [27]: the
notion of universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price which requires that the
price vector is a CE price not only for the main economy but also for all marginal
economies.
Definition 15 A price vector p is called a universal competitive equilibrium (UCE)
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[universal quasi competitive equilibrium (quasi-UCE)] price vector if p is a CE [quasi-
CE] price vector of economy E(S) for every S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ N − 1.
As formalized in proposition 5.2 in next section, the computation of the Vickrey
payoff vector with an ascending auction would require the violation of the minimality
property. As a corollary, an ascending auction that ends in a UCE price vector for
general valuations would violate the minimality property.
At this stage, we have tried solely to implement a bidder-optimal CE payoff
and not a specific payoff vector in BOCE(N , v) according to some specific selection
rule.19 It brings us to move to the problem of determining the entire set of bidder-
optimal CE payoffs from a given CE price p. In the same way as the price vector that
implements the Vickrey payoff vector can be computed from a UCE price vector, we
could conjecture that the set of bidder-optimal semi-truthful CE price vectors can
be computed from a quasi-UCE semi-truthful price vector. This conjecture is not
true under general valuations as shown by the following example.
Example Consider four bidders and three goods a,b and c. Consider that bidder
1 (resp. 2 and 3) values V ≥ 4 any bundle containing the good a (resp. b and c)
and 0 any other bundle. Consider that bidder 4 values 8 the bundle abc and 0 any
other bundle. The efficient assignment is the one that gives the goods a, b and c
respectively to bidders 1, 2 and 3. Consider then the semi-truthful price vector p
such that γ(p) = (12, V − 4, V − 4, V − 4, 0), i.e. p is the semi-truthful price vector
characterized by p1,a = p2,b = p3,c = 4 and p4,abc = 8. p is a UCE price vector for
any V ≥ 4. Nevertheless, the set of bidder-optimal semi-truthful CE payoff vectors
depends strictly on V for V ≥ 4. If V ≥ 8, then the price vector p∗ such that p∗i,H = 0
for i = 1, 2 and any H, p∗3,H = 8 if c ⊆ H and 0 otherwise and p∗4,H = p4,H for any
H is a bidder-optimal semi-truthful CE price vector. On the contrary, if V < 8, p∗
is not a CE price vector.
Since the knowledge of the full set of bidder-optimal semi-truthful CE price vec-
tors implies the knowledge of the semi-truthful price vector that implements the
Vickrey payoff vector,20 then it means that we need to explore bidders’ preferences
strictly more than with a UCE price vector. In other words, the computation of
19See Erdil and Klemperer [18] for a new proposal on this topic.
20For a given bidder, the Vickrey payoff corresponds to the upper bound of his payoffs among
the set BOCE(N , v) (Bikhchandani and Ostroy [5]).
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the entire set of bidder-optimal semi-truthful CE price vectors requires a greater
violation of the minimality property than in Mishra and Parkes [34].
5 Ascending Vickrey auctions
As a corollary of propositions 2.1 and 4.5, we obtain a positive result for the
implementation of the Vickrey payoff vector with some minimal ascending auctions
under preferences such that the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium
payoff vector.
Proposition 5.1 Assume integer valuations and truthful bidding. In the class of
joint preferences such that the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium
payoff vector, any QCE-invariant ascending auction with unit increments and with
a maximal price discount rule yields the Vickrey payoff vector.
When the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff vector, then
the MP discount rule also yields the Vickrey payoffs (Proposition 4.4). Consequently,
proposition 5.1 also holds for any QCE-invariant ascending auction with unit incre-
ments and with the MP discount rule. Nevertheless, as discussed in section 7, there
are then robustness criteria that would make the use of a maximal price discount rule
strictly profitable to the MP discount rule although they coincide on the (truthful)
equilibrium path.
Mishra and Parkes [34]’s resolution of the impossibility to implement the Vick-
rey payoffs with a standard ascending auction relies on an ascending auction with
discounts that fails to be minimal. Next result shows that this departure from one
essential feature that makes ascending auctions desirable with respect to their sealed-
bid counterpart can not be avoided.
Proposition 5.2 Under general (integer) valuations, there is no minimal ascending
auction that yields the Vickrey payoff vector under truthful bidding.
We build an example with two goods and three bidders where only one bidder
fails the gross substitutes condition. Contrary to proposition 4.1, the impossibility
result naturally does not hold if the Vickrey payoff vector is guaranteed to be a
competitive equilibrium where proposition 5.1 would apply.
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6 The traps of increments
Though real-life auctions typically involve price increments that do not fit with
the valuation grid, most of the literature on ascending auctions consider the restric-
tion of integer valuations coupled with unit increments such that bidders’ indifference
curves can be fully recovered. In the environment with unit-demand, the ascending
auction in Demange et al. [15] is shown to be robust to price increments: the ap-
proximate auction leads to an approximation of the Vickrey payoffs. In the same
vein and for the simultaneous ascending auction under substitutable preferences,
Milgrom [32] establishes a bound on the efficiency loss that depends linearly on the
increment.21 The starting point of this section is an impossibility result, proposition
6.1, that challenges the usual perspective that increments are adding just a noise that
vanishes when they are chosen sufficiently small: with general valuations and for any
standard ascending auction with -increments with  > 0, the efficiency loss does not
vanish when the increment goes to zero. More precisely, this kind of discontinuity
occurs when at least one bidder values the goods as complements.
Proposition 6.1 Suppose that there are two goods G = {a, b} and N ≥ 3. Suppose
one bidder’s valuation function, say v1, fails the gross substitutes condition. Then
there exists a class of gross substitutes valuation functions for the other bidders,
(Vj)2≤j≤N , such that under truthful bidding:
there exists α > 0 such that no standard ascending auction with -increments
with  > 0 yields an assignment whose welfare α-approximates the welfare from an
efficient assignment for each profile from v1 × V2 × · · · × VN .
The proof which is relegated in appendix I relies on a very simple intuition. In
order to outbid some bidders that have complementary preferences, the auctioneer
has to raise the prices of several bidders. Some of those challenging bidders may
prefer to quit the auction though the dynamic of the auction may reveal latter that
such a bidder makes a strictly positive contribution to the welfare. This is exactly
the same intuition as the one that drives the example in section 3: the auctioneer has
pushed the prices too high in an inappropriate way. At first glance, this impossibility
result could be viewed as an artifact of the present definition of an ascending auction
21See also Crawford and Knoer [11] and Kelso and Crawford [25] for continuity results with
respect to the existence of a competitive equilibrium in respectively the unit demand case and
general valuations satisfying the gross substitute condition.
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where it is the auctioneer instead of the bidders themselves that raises the bids: if
it were the bidders that raise their bids, then bidders would never quit the auction.
However, as discussed at the end of this section, this problem gives some insights for
the practical implementation of multi-object ascending auctions where bidders that
do not bid actively have to exit the auction according to so-called activity rules that
are used in real-life multi-object auctions.
The impossibility to approximate the welfare from an efficient assignment in
proposition 6.1 crucially relies on the failure of substitutability. If bidders value the
goods as substitutes, the simultaneous ascending auction considered by Milgrom [32]
is a standard ascending auction with strictly positive increments that implements
approximately an efficient assignment without any need of a combinatorial pricing
system: see Theorem 2 in Milgrom [32] for a proper formalization. Nevertheless,
this positive result under substitutable preferences does not mean that any ‘natural’
standard ascending auction becomes efficient when the increments vanish. The fol-
lowing example shows that QCE-invariant ascending auctions with -increments may
fail to be efficient when the increment goes to zero even if bidders are substitutes.
Example Consider two identical bidders with additive preferences and two goods
a,b such that bidder 1 values the good a 10 and good b 5, while bidder 2 values the
good a 5 and good b 10. In a QCE-invariant ascending auctions with -increments,
the price dynamic takes the following form under truthful bidding: in a first step,
only the prices on the bundle ab are rising. Bidders 1 and 2 alternate to be the
winning bidder. In a second step, bidders are starting to bid on the individual
goods. However, at each step the winning assignment remains one where both units
are assigned to the same bidder, alternatively 1 and 2, such that when the losing
bidder demand one good alone, then the opponent bidder demands only the bundle
ab such that any assignment L∗N (pt) allocates both goods to one bidder. Finally,
when the auction stops, the final assignment is never the efficient one that gives good
a to bidder 1 and good b to bidder 2. Note also that bidders’ payoff goes to 0 when
 goes to 0 while the corresponding Vickrey payoff equals 5.
In the above example, it is clear that truthful bidding is not an appealing strategy
profile.22
Definition 16 A price vector p is called a pseudo-CE price vector (of the main
22See Börgers and Dustmann [7] for an empirical failure of truthful bidding.
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economy) if there is an assignment A ∈ A such that Ai /∈ Di(p; v) implies that
pi,Ai > 0 for every bidder i ∈ N and such that A ∈ LN (p).
Remark 6.1 CE price vectors are obviously pseudo-CE. If a price vector is semi-
truthful, then the converse holds since pi,Ai > 0 implies that Ai ∈ Di(p; v).
Definition 17 A QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments and with -
discounts is a QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments with Step (S1.2)
replaced by “If pt is a pseudo-CE price vector with respect to reported demand sets,
then go to Step S2 with T := t”, (S1.3) replaced by “Else, select a temporary winning
assignment At ∈ LN (pt) and a (non-empty)23 set of temporary losers Lt ⊂ N such
that Ati /∈ Di(pt; v) and pti,Ati for any i ∈ L
t who will see a price increase” and
(S2) replaced by “The auction ends with the final assignment of the auction being
any AT ∈ LN (pT ) and the final payment of every bidder i ∈ N being pTi,ATi if
ATi ∈ Di(p; v), pTi,ATi −  if A
T
i /∈ Di(p; v) and pTi,ATi > 0 and 0 otherwise, where p
T is
the final price vector of the auction”.
Auctions with -discounts can be viewed ‘roughly’ as an auction where, at each
step, the seller maximizes her revenue not solely according to the current set of bids
but taking into account all previous submitted bids. While the notion of a quasi-CE
requires that ATi ∈ Di(pT ; v) at the last round T , the notion of a pseudo-CE requires
the weaker condition that ATi ∈ Di(pt; v) for some round t ≤ T , i.e. the bundle ATi
has been demanded by bidder i in the auction history. A key point, that results from
lemma 2.1, is that in such a case, if from the final price pT the price for the bundle
ATi is discounted by an increment , then the bundle ATi belongs to the demand set
with respect to the final discounted price vector.
Remark 6.2 Under integer valuations and with unit increments, the price pt is semi-
truthful at each round t such that any QCE-invariant ascending auction with unit
increments and with -discounts ends at a semi-truthful pseudo-CE price vector.
From remark 6.1, it ends thus at a CE price vector such that the discount stage
vanishes and the auction coincides thus with a QCE-invariant ascending auction
with unit increments.
23This set is not empty. Otherwise, pt would be a pseudo-CE price vector and the algorithm
would have stopped in the previous stage (S1.2).
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The following proposition shows how proposition 4.2 is robust to -increments if
we allow -discounts. The other possibility results in sections 4 and 5 can be handled
in the same way. Let kT = (kTi )i∈N denote the final bidder-payoff vector (after the
-discounts). Note that kTi ∈ [kTi , kTi + ] for any i ∈ N .
Proposition 6.2 For any QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments and
with -discounts under truthful bidding:
• The final bidder-payoff vector kT [(N + 1) · ]-approximates the set of weak
bidder-optimal competitive CE payoffs wBOCE(N , v), i.e. there exists γ ∈
wBOCE(N , v) such that |γi − kTi | ≤ (N + 1) ·  for any i ∈ N .
• The welfare at the final assignment [N · ]-approximates the welfare from an
efficient assignment.
As a corollary, for any vector of valuations v ∈ R2G×N+ , there exists ∗ such
that any QCE-invariant ascending auction with -increments implements an
efficient assignment if  ≤ ∗.
• If bidders are substitutes, then the final bidder-payoff vector kT [(N + 1) · ]-
approximates the Vickrey payoff vector.
Activity Rules in combinatorial auctions24 QCE-invariant ascending auc-
tions with -increments are closely related to the combinatorial auction formats that
have been proposed for some licenses by the FCC as discussed by the Public Notices
DA 00-1075 [19] and DA 07-3415 [20]. The seemly differences between our class of
ascending auctions and simultaneous ascending auctions as developed by the FCC
are misleading: the former are clock auctions where bidders are reporting demand
set while bidders are submitting bids in the latter. At first glance, it seems thus
that the exit of a bidder that contributes strictly to the welfare cannot occur with
sufficiently low increments. However, in those latter ascending formats, the need
for activity rules as emphasized by Milgrom [32] could restore the issue: the typical
24For a rigorous formalization of activity rules, see Harsha et al. [23]. In particular, they introduce
‘strong activity rules’ which allow only reports that are compatible with some class of preferences
(possibly larger than ours, e.g. allowing budget constraints). In our framework and with integer
valuations and unit increments, it corresponds to impose to the bidders that their demand set should
increase over time. We emphasize that such a restriction would be inappropriate for practical design
in a perspective where valuations are not fixed but where bidders are refining their knowledge about
their valuations in the process of the auction as in Compte and Jehiel [8, 9] or similarly if valuations
were interdependent.
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activity rule is to require that bidders that do not obtain any good in the temporary
winning assignment have to submit an active bid in order to remain eligible to stay
in the auction, i.e. such that all his previously submitted bids can be used by the
auctioneer to maximize her revenue. Without any proper formalization, the F.C.C.
report [19] emphasizes that the activity rules should take into account the intrica-
cies of package bidding design: “Retained bids include the provisional winning bids,
plus bids that have the potential to become provisional bids because of changes in
other bids in subsequent rounds. Assuming that bids in the auction may only rise,
bids that could never be winning bids are not retained”. Indeed, such a rule does
not define precisely the way to retain a bid and thus a bidder as active: it is not
clear how a given bid cannot appear as a potential winning bid in subsequent rounds
and thus that such an activity rule is really binding to give proper incentive to bid
actively. An alternative interpretation of proposition 6.2 is a theoretical foundation
for the following activity rule: bidders that do not obtain any good in the temporary
winning assignment have to submit an active bid in order to remain eligible to bid
in the auction but all bids that have been submitted by an inactive bidder, who is
thus not eligible to submit additional bids in the auction, are remaining as active
bids when the auctioneer seeks a provisional winning assignment. This is precisely
the rule retained by the FCC [20] for the first combinatorial spectrum auction for
the Block C of the 700 MHz licenses bands run in 2008 where losing eligibility does
not mean the exit of the auction but corresponds to the inability to place additional
bids. The FCC has followed the combinatorial design proposed and investigated
experimentally by Goeree and Holt [21] where the set of possible packages is limited
and tailored to some hierarchical structure that kills the computational issues that
are traditionally associated with combinatorial auctions.
7 Conclusion
The main methodological contribution of the paper is to refine the definition of
an ascending auction pioneered by Gul and Stacchetti [22] and then de Vries et al.
[14] who introduced the idea of a linkage between final prices and bidders’ monetary
transfers. On the one hand, we relax this latter linkage by allowing a final price
discount stage as in Mishra and Parkes [34]. On the other hand, we introduce the
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minimality property that establishes a linkage between demand revelation and how
prices are rising. It allows us to revisit the issue of the implementation of the Vickrey
payoff vector through an ascending auction. We have also considered the issue of the
implementation of a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium. In the case where the
Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff, a case that has received
a careful attention here because the discount stage we propose brings then a clear
benefit with respect to the literature, the two implementation problems coincide.
Contrary to Vickrey implementation that has a theoretical foundation in term of
incentive compatibility, the foundation for the implementation of a bidder-optimal
competitive equilibrium is less clear. Nevertheless, Day and Milgrom [13] argue
that auctions that implement bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium payoffs are
maximizing bidders’ incentives for truthful reporting among those that implement
competitive equilibrium payoffs and are thus robust to shill bidding contrary to
Vickrey auctions as shown by Yokoo et al. [43].25 We also emphasize the surprising
insight that in the case where the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium
payoff, then an auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium
payoff may be strictly preferable to an auction that implements the Vickrey payoff
vector though they both yield the same outcome under truthful bidding: the point
is that those auctions differ outside the (truthful) equilibrium path and, e.g., the
former are robust to shill bidding or to losing bidders’ joint deviations while the
latter are not.26
Coming back to our preliminary motivations that sustain our interest in devel-
oping ascending multi-object formats, we emphasize that the arguments in favor of
ascending formats have been formalized mainly for the single-unit environment. A
better understanding of how those arguments can be extended and possibly strength-
ened to multi-object environments is left for further research.
25Day and Milgrom [13]’s argument with regards to revenue monotonicity is not correct except
when there are only two goods for sale as investigated by Lamy [29].
26See Lamy [28] for illustrations of such an insight under preferences involving allocative exter-
nalities.
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Appendix
A Proof of lemma 2.1
The inequality vi,Ai − pti,Ai ≤ kti comes from the definition of the demand set of
bidder i. It remains to show that pti(Ai) > 0 implies that kti −  < vi,Ai − pti,Ai .
Suppose by contradiction that pti(Ai) > 0 and pti,Ai ≥ vi,Ai − kti + . From time t’s
perspective, consider the last round t∗ where the price on assignment Ai has been
raised for bidder i (such a round exists since pti(Ai) > 0): we have then pt∗i,Ai =
pti,Ai −  ≥ vi,Ai − kti > vi,Ai − kt
∗
i where the equality comes from the definition of t∗
and the last inequality comes from Step (1.4) where all bundles that belong to the
demand set at t∗ see a price increase such that optimal profit at t are strictly lower
than at t∗. Finally, we obtain that Ai /∈ Di(pt∗) which raises a contradiction with
Step (S1.4) where only prices for assignments in the demand set are raised.
B Proof of lemma 2.3
Consider p a price vector that is semi-truthful and a quasi-CE. We show that
L∗N (p) ⊆ LN (p) such that p is thus a CE. Pick A /∈ LN (p). There exists thus
A ∈ LN (p) such that
∑
i∈N pi,Ai >
∑
i∈N pi,Ai . We then build A∗ ∈ A such that,
for any i ∈ N , A∗i := ∅ if pi,Ai = 0 and A∗i := Ai otherwise. Since p is semi-truthful
we have A∗i ∈ {∅, Di(p; v)} for all i ∈ N . Furthermore
∑
i∈N pi,A∗i =
∑
i∈N pi,Ai .
Finally we obtain
∑
i∈N pi,A∗i >
∑
i∈N pi,Ai and thus A /∈ L∗N (p). L∗N (p) ⊆ LN (p)
then implies the equality (1).
C Price path under infinitesimal increments
D Proof of proposition 4.1
Let A, {Bk}k=1,··· ,5, {Ck}k=1,··· ,5 denote the goods. Each bidder i = 1, · · · , 5
values V > 0 any bundle that contains the goods A, Bi and Ci, while any alternative
bundle is valued either V or 0 with V < 2 · V . In the neighborhood of the null
prices, the demand set of each bidder i is thus known ex ante: it corresponds to
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Table 3: Progress of the QCE-invariant ascending auction with infinitesimal incre-
ments
bidder 1 bidder 2 bidder 3 bidder 4
One Two One Two One Two One Two
Values → 10 10 4 8 4 8 0 7
↓ Phases
1 (0) (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Agents are bidding on the most preferred assignments 3/4 of the time
while their most preferred assignments are selected 1/4 of the time
2 (4) (4) (0) (4) (0) (4) 0 (4)
Agent 1 is bidding on the most preferred assignment 1/5 of the time
Agents 2 and 3 are bidding on the most preferred assignment 3/5 of the time
Agent 4 is bidding on the most preferred assignment 4/5 of the time
1/5 of the time: two items are assigned to agent 4
2/5 of the time: one item is assigned to agents 1 and 2
2/5 of the time: one item is assigned to agents 1 and 3
3 (4.75) (4.75) (2.25) (6.25) (2.25) (6.25) (0) (7)
Agents 2 and 3 are bidding on the most preferred assignment 1/2 of the time
1/2 of the time: one item is assigned to agents 1 and 2
1/2 of the time: one item is assigned to agents 1 and 3
4 (4.75) (4.75) (4) (8) (4) (8) (0) (7)
Selected assignment: bidders 1 and 3’ receive one item.
The revenue is 8.75. A CE price vector is reached.
Final payoffs: (8.75, 5.25, 0, 0, 0) ; Vickrey payoff vector: (8, 6, 0, 0, 0)
the subset of the bundles with the smallest prices among the set of the bundles
that contain the goods A, Bi and Ci. Furthermore, from the symmetry between
the bidders, it is sufficient to argue that raising strictly the minimum price from
the bundles that contain the goods A, B1 and C1 for bidder 1 may prevent the
implementation of a payoff in BOCE(N , v) since the preferences of the remaining
bidders may imply that the monetary transfer of bidder 1 should be null for any payoff
in BOCE(N , v). More precisely, we exhibit a realization of the preferences such that
the set BOCE(N , v) is a singleton and then corresponds to the Vickrey payoff vector.
Among the remaining bundles that do not contain the goods A, B1 and C1, bidder
1 is valuing all bundles 0. Among the remaining bundles that do not contain the
goods A, B2 and C2, suppose that bidder 2 values V the bundles containing the
bundle G2 = {B3, B4, B5, C4}. Similarly, bidder 3 values V the bundles containing
the bundle G3 = {B2, B4, B5, C5}, bidder 4 values V the bundles containing the
bundle G4 = {C2, C3, C5, B2} and finally bidder 5 values V the bundles containing
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the bundle G5 = {C2, C3, C4, B3}. Below we assume that i, j, k and l belong to
{2, · · · , 5} and are distinct. Note that G2∩G4 = ∅, G3∩G5 = ∅ and that, any other
couples i, j, we have Gi ∩Gj 6= ∅. We have also Gi ∩ {A,Bj, Cj} 6= ∅.
The characteristic function corresponding to such preferences is given by: w({1}) =
w({i}) = V ; w({1, i}) = V + V w({i, j}) = 2V if {i, j} = {2, 4} or {i, j} = {3, 5}
otherwise w({i, j}) = V ; w(N \ {1, i}) = 2V , w(N \ {i, j}) = V + 2V if {i, j} =
{2, 4} or {i, j} = {3, 5} otherwise w(N \ {i, j}) = V + V ; w(N \ {1}) = 2V and
w(N \ {i}) = V + 2V and finally w(N ) = V + 2V . The Vickrey payoff vector
is (2V , V , 0, 0, 0, 0): bidder 1 pays a null price for the bundle {A,B1, C1}. From
proposition 2.1 it remains to check that this payoff is in the Core by checking the
coalitional constraints from the expression of w.
E Proof of proposition 4.2
First note that the auction dynamic does not stop if a CE has not been reached
since from lemma 2.3 it would imply that we have not reached a quasi-CE because
prices are semi-truthful along the price path. Second, any CE is a quasi-CE such
that the auction dynamic stops once a CE outcome has been reached.
So we are sure to end in the set of CE payoffs. Let p the final CE where the
auction stops. Suppose that the final payoff (γi(p))i∈N does not 1−approximates
wBOCE(N , v). We now show that it would imply that the payoff vector γ′ where
γ′0 = γ0(p)−N and γ′i = γi(p)+1 for any i ∈ N belongs to CEP (N , v) or equivalently
belongs to the Core. Suppose that it is not the case. From standard convex analysis
(see in Rockafellar [40]), the Core is a polyhedral convex set and there exists thus
a hyperplane separating the Core and the point γ′. Thus there is a point in the
interval27 [γ(p), γ′] which belongs to the weak bidder-optimal frontier raising thus a
contradiction with (γi(p))i∈N not 1−approximating the set wBOCE(N , v). Finally
we have proved that the outcome γ′ is in the Core. Then as pointed by remark 2.1,
the whole cube C =
{
z ∈ RN+1|γi(p) ≤ zi ≤ γ′i
}
is included in the Core or following
remark 2.2, equivalently, the set of semi-truthful prices CP = {p ∈ R2G×N+ | ∃γ ∈ C :
p = P(γ)} is included in CEP (N , v). In the previous round of any QCE-invariant
ascending auction with 1-increments, the state of the price vector in the algorithm
27For x, y ∈ RN+1 with x ≤ y, let [x, y] denote the set {z ∈ RN+1 | ∃λ ∈ [0, 1] : z = λ·x+(1−λ)·y}.
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was necessary in CP , which raises a contradiction with the aforementioned point that
the auction dynamic stops once a CE has been reached.
Remark Note that if we choose the sets of temporary losers in the steps (S1.3)
such that they are singletons28, then the final payoff vector is exactly a weak bidder-
optimal CE payoff vector.
The result when bidders are substitutes can be obtained by following the proof
of de Vries et al. [14]’s Theorem 4. Note that this is exactly what we will do in
Appendix J but under an additional ingredient: general increments.
F Proof of lemma 4.1
Consider a semi-truthful price p. Let γ ∈ RN+ such that p = P(γ), i.e. γi = γi(p)
for any i ∈ N . As a preliminary, note that we have Di(P(γ); v) = {H ⊆ G | vi,H ≥
min {γi, vi,G}}. As a corollary, under semi-truthful prices, when prices shrink then
the demand set can only shrink. In particular, if ∅ /∈ Di(p; v) then ∅ /∈ Di(β(e; p); v)
for any e ∈ RN+ .
We first show the inclusion Γ(p) ⊆ [γ(p)]+ ∩ CEP (N , v). First Γ(p) ⊆ [γ(p)]+
since bidder payoffs increase after prices discounts. To obtain the inclusion Γ(p) ⊆
CEP (N , v), we show that if p a semi-truthful quasi-CE, then [p′ ∈ H(p) ⇒ p′ ∈
CEP (N , v)]. Consider p′ ∈ H(p). So there exists e ∈ RN+ and an assignment A∗
such that p′ = β(e; p), ei ≤ pi,A∗i , A∗ ∈ ArgmaxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p)}
∑
i∈N p
′
i,Ai and
(p,A∗) is a quasi-CE. We have A∗i ∈ Di(p) and ei ≤ pi,A∗i which guarantees thus
that A∗i ∈ Di(β(e; p)) since p is semi-truthful. Di(p′; v) ⊆ Di(p; v) implies that
maxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p)}
∑
i∈N p
′
i,Ai ≥ maxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p′)}
∑
i∈N p
′
i,Ai and thus that A∗ ∈
ArgmaxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p′)}
∑
i∈N p
′
i,Ai , i.e. A∗ ∈ L∗N (p′). Finally, we have shown that
(p′,A∗) is a quasi-CE and thus with lemma 2.3 we conclude that p is a CE price
vector.
Then it remains to show the inclusion [γ(p)]+ ∩ CEP (N , v) ⊆ Γ(p) holds for
any semi-truthful vector p. Consider γ∗ ∈ [γ(p)]+ ∩ CEP (N , v) or equivalently
γ∗ ∈ [γ(p)]+ ∩ Core(N , v). It is then sufficient to show that P(γ∗) ∈ H(p) in order
to obtain γ∗ ∈ Γ(p). By means of standard calculations, we have for any γ ∈ RN+
28From a practical perspective where the pace of the auction is an important issue as in spectrum
auctions, it would slow the auction dynamic.
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with γi ≤ vi,G for any i ∈ N :
max
A∈A
∑
j∈N
[P(γ)]j,Aj = maxA∈A
∑
j∈N
max {0, vj,Aj − γj}
= max
S⊆N
max
A∈A
[
∑
j∈S
vj,Aj − γj]
= max
S⊆N
[w(S)−
∑
j∈S
γj].
Furthermore, if γ∗ ∈ Core(N , v), then S = N is a solution of the maximization
program maxS⊆N [w(S)−
∑
j∈S γ
∗
j ] or equivalently from the calculation above there
exists A∗ with A∗i ∈ Di(P(γ∗); v) for any i ∈ N which is a solution of the maximiza-
tion program maxA∈A
∑
j∈N [P(γ∗)]j,Aj . Consider the vector e = γ∗ − γ(p) ∈ RN+
(since γ∗ ∈ [γ(p)]+) and the assignment A∗. First we have P(γ∗) = β(e, p) from
the definition of the function P(.). Second, A∗i ∈ Di(p; v) since Di(P(γ∗); v) ⊆
Di(P(γ(p)); v) = Di(p; v). Third, A∗i ∈ Di(p; v) ∩Di(P(γ∗); v) implies that vi,A∗i =
pi,A∗i + [γ(p)]i,A∗i = [P(γ∗)]i,A∗i + [γ∗]i,A∗i and thus ei = pi,A∗i − [P(γ∗)]i,A∗i ≤ pi,A∗i .
FourthA∗ ∈ maxA∈A
∑
i∈N [P(γ∗)]i,Ai = maxA∈A|Ai∈{∅,Di(p;v)}
∑
i∈N [P(γ∗)]i,Ai where
the last equality is satisfied because A∗i ∈ Di(p; v) for any i ∈ N . Last, for
any A ∈ A we have ∑i∈N [P(γ(p))]i,Ai ≤ ∑i∈N [P(γ∗)]i,Ai + ∑i∈N ei and thus
maxA∈A
∑
i∈N [P(γ(p))]i,Ai ≤ maxA∈A
∑
i∈N [P(γ∗)]i,Ai +
∑
i∈N ei while we have∑
i∈N [P(γ(p))]i,A∗i =
∑
i∈N [P(γ∗)]i,A∗i +
∑
i∈N ei = maxA∈A
∑
i∈N P(γ∗)+
∑
i∈N ei.
Finally we obtain that A∗ ∈ L∗N (p). Gathering those last five points we have shown
precisely that P(γ∗) ∈ H(p) which completes the proof.
G Proof of proposition 4.4
The price discount rule defined by Mishra and Parkes [34] (p. 148) for bidder i
at a quasi-CE price vector p is given by:
eMPi (p) := maxA∈A
∑
j∈N
pj,Aj −maxA∈A
∑
j∈N\{i}
pj,Aj .
We now show that eMPi (p) = ei(p) for any i ∈ N if p is a semi-truthful CE price
vector. Let ei denote the vector in RN+ such that eij = 0 if j 6= i and eii = 1. In a
similar calculation as one lead in appendix F, for any scalar λ ≥ 0 we have by means
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of equation (1) and standard calculations:
max
A∈A|Aj∈{∅,Dj(p;v)}
∑
j∈N
[β(λei; p)]j,Aj = maxA∈A
∑
j∈N
[β(λei; p)]j,Aj = γ0(β(λe
i; p))
= max
S⊆N
[w(S)−
∑
j∈S
γj(β(λe
i; p))]
= max { max
S⊆N ,i/∈S
[w(S)−
∑
j∈S
γj(p)], max
S⊆N ,i∈S
[w(S)−
∑
j∈S
γj(p)]− λ}
= max {max
A∈A
∑
j∈N\{i}
pj,Aj , (maxA∈A
∑
j∈N
pj,Aj)− λ}
The positive scalar ei(p) is precisely defined as the greatest scalar λ ≥ 0 such
that there is A ∈ A with A ∈ ArgmaxA∈A|Aj∈{∅,Dj(p;v)}
∑
j∈N [β(λe
i; p)]j,Aj , A ∈
ArgmaxA∈A
∑
j∈N pj,Aj and with Aj ∈ Dj(p; v) for any j. Thus we have for any
i ∈ N :
max
A∈A|Aj∈{∅,Dj(p;v)}
∑
j∈N
[β(ei(p)e
i; p)]j,Aj = maxA∈A
∑
j∈N
pj,Aj − ei(p).
Finally we obtain from the above calculation that ei(p) = eMPi (p). From the
definition of ei(p), the price discounts in a maximal discount rule are smaller than
in the MP discount rule.
It remains to show that bidders’ payoffs after the MP discount rule are smaller
than Vickrey payoffs: γi(δMP (p,D)) ≤ γVi for any i ∈ N . Let A∗ be an assignment
such that (p,A∗) is a quasi-CE and thus a CE since p is semi-truthful. The inequality
above is thus equivalent to:
=γi(p)+e
MP
i (p)︷ ︸︸ ︷
vi,A∗i − pi,A∗i +
∑
j∈N
pj,A∗j −maxA∈A {
∑
j∈N\{i}
pj,Aj} ≤
=γVi︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j∈N
vj,A∗j −maxA∈A {
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj,Aj} .
Since A∗i ∈ Di(p; v) for any i ∈ N this is also equivalent to
∑
j∈N\{i}
[γ(p)]i +maxA∈A
{
∑
j∈N\{i}
pj,Aj} ≥ maxA∈A {
∑
j∈N\{i}
vj,Aj}.
This last inequality holds since [γ(p)]i + pj,Aj ≥ vj,Aj for any j ∈ N and A ∈ A.
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H Proof of proposition 5.2
Consider two heterogeneous goods a and b. Let V1 denote the set of preferences
such that v1,a = v1,b = 0 and v1,ab = x1 ∈ N such that bidder 1’s valuation function
fails the gross substitutes condition if x1 > 0. Let V2 [resp. V3] denote the set of
preferences such that v2,ab = v2,a = x2 ∈ N and v2,b = 0 [resp. v3,ab = v3,a = x3 ∈ N
and v3,b = 0]. Bidders’ valuations are reduced to the three integers x1, x2 and x3. We
show that there is no minimal ascending auction that yields the Vickrey payoffs on the
domain V1×V2×V3. Consider a moment in time t where the demand sets of bidders
1, 2 and 3 do not contain the empty set. Since the price path is ascending while the
price for the empty bundle remains zero in a minimal auction, then the demand sets of
bidders 1, 2 and 3 do not contain the empty set at any time t′ ≤ t. At such a moment
in time, the unique information we have with regards to bidders’ valuation functions
is: x1 > P1,ab(t), x2 > P2,a(t) and x3 > P3,b(t). In a minimal auction, the provisional
revenue raised by an assignment in L∗N (P (t)) is either P1,ab(t) if the assignment
that allocates both goods to bidder 1 belongs to L∗N (P (t)) or P2,a(t) + P3,b(t) if the
assignment that allocates a to bidder 2 and b to bidder 3 belongs to L∗N (P (t)). We
now show that in any minimal ascending auction that yields the Vickrey payoffs the
inequalities P1,ab(t) − 2 ≤ P2,a(t) + P3,b(t) ≤ P1,ab(t) + 4 should be satisfied at any
time t such that the demand sets of bidders 1, 2 and 3 do not contain the empty set
for any time t′ < t. Suppose on the contrary that one of those inequalities fails to
hold.
First, suppose that P1,ab(t) > P2,a(t) + P3,b(t) + 2. If bidder 1’s prices have never
been raised, then we have necessarily P1,ab(t) = P1,ab(0) > 2 such that the auction can
never make a distinction between the cases x1 = 0, 1 or 2 which raises a contradiction
with the efficiency property since the final efficient assignment would strictly depend
on the exact value of x1 ∈ {0, 1, 2} if x2 = 1 and x3 = 0. Thus there exists a point
in time where bidder 1’s prices have been raised and from the minimality property
there exists t′ < t such that P1,ab(t′) ≤ P2,a(t′)+P3,b(t′) ≤ P2,a(t)+P3,b(t). However,
it means that if bidder 1 reports a null demand set after such a jump, then bidder 1
can have at least two distinct valuations: the interval (P1,ab(t′), P1,ab(t)) contains at
least two two integers, denote s and s+1 the two lowest integers in this set and that
are strictly above P2,a(t) + P3,b(t). Since prices are increasing, then there is no way
to learn which one of those valuations is the right one. However, such an uncertainty
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could matter in term of Vickrey pricing since it could prevent the computation of the
Vickrey payoffs. Let x2 and x3 be equal to the lowest integers that are respectively
strictly above P2,a(t) and P3,b(t). Then we have either x2 < s + 1 or x3 < s + 1
(otherwise we have 2 + s ≥ x2 + x3 ≥ 2(s + 1) which raises a contradiction since
s > 0). Suppose that bidders’ valuations are such that the efficient assignment is to
give item a to 2 and b to 3, i.e. x2 + x3 > s + 1 (e.g. if the inequality x2 < s + 1
holds, then choose x3 high enough). Then the Vickrey payoffs differ whether bidder
1’s valuation x1 is set to s or s+1: the payment will differ for bidder 2 if x3 < s+1
or for bidder 3 if x2 < s+ 1.
Second, suppose that P1,ab(t) < P2,a(t) + P3,b(t) − 4. In the same way, it would
mean that a jump has occurred for one of the prices P2,a and P3,b. Otherwise,
P2,a(t) = P2,a(0) and P3,b(t) = P3,b(0), which implies that P2,a(t) + P3,b(t) > 4 and
then that either P2,a(0) > 2 or P3,b(0) > 2 which would prevent the implementation
of the efficient assignment on the domain V1 × V2 × V3. More precisely, a jump of
an extend greater than 2 has occurred such that the precise valuation of of those
bidders can not be learned anymore since prices are increasing. However, if bidder
1’s valuation were high enough such that the efficient assignment is to give him the
bundle ab with the price x2+x3 and a contradiction is raised with the implementation
of the Vickrey payoffs.29
In a nutshell, we have shown that the prices P1,ab(t), P2,a(t) and P3,b(t) can never
be shifted by strictly more than 2. Otherwise there would be an irreversible lack of
information to implement the Vickrey payoffs since prices are increasing.
Consider the subset of V1×V2×V3 such that x1 = 20, x2, x3 ∈ {17, 18, 19, 20}. The
auction dynamic should be such that at some time t∗ we have 20 ≤ P1,ab(t∗) < 22.
Otherwise, if P1,ab(t) < 20 for any t ∈ [0, 1], there would be no way to learn that
bidder 1’s valuation equals 20 or a greater valuation such that the efficient assignment
would be to assign the bundle ab to bidder 1. At this time t∗, bidder 1’s prices are
then frozen. Our previous analysis has shown that P1,ab(t∗) ≥ P2,a(t∗) + P3,b(t∗)− 4
such that we have either P2,a(t) < 13 or P3,a(t) < 13. Without loss of generality,
say that P2,a(t) < 13. Then there is no way to learn precisely bidder 2’s valuation
in the set {17, 18, 19, 20} since after P2,a(t) ≥ 17, then any further price increase is
29Under general continuous valuations we would obtain the equality P2,a(t) + P3,b(t) = P1,ab(t)
up to any time where the demand sets of bidders 1, 2 and 3 do not contain the empty set in any
minimal ascending auction that yields the Vickrey payoffs.
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frozen. Otherwise it would violate the minimality assumption. By setting only one
price above 17, it is not possible to distinguish surely between four valuations.30 On
the whole it is not possible to compute the Vickrey payoff of the bidder j ∈ {2, 3}
with j 6= i.
Finally, we have shown that there is no minimal ascending auction that yields
the Vickrey payoffs on the domain V1 × V2 × V3.31
I Proof of proposition 6.1
Under an ascending auction with -increments with  > 0 then each price can
take only a finite number of values. Each time the price vector of a given bidder
is shifted in a way that his demand set is uncertain then we will speak of a price
inquiry to this bidder.
Suppose without loss of generality that bidder 1’s valuation function fails the gross
substitutes condition: v1(ab) > v1(a)+ v1(b) ≥ 0. Let z = v1(ab)− v1(a)− v1(b). Let
V2 [resp. V3] denote the set of preferences such that v2(ab) = v2(a) ∈ (v1(a), v1(a)+
v1(b) + z] and v2(b) = 0 [resp. v3(ab) = v3(a) ∈ (v1(b), v1(a) + v1(b) + z] and
v3(b) = 0]. Let α = min {v1(a), v1(b), z/2}. We show that no ascending auction
with -increments with  > 0 yields an assignment whose welfare α-approximates
the welfare from an efficient assignment for each profile from v1×V2×· · ·×Vn. The
price dynamic can be viewed as a list of inquiries to refine our knowledge on bidders
2 and 3’s preferences. Without additional knowledge, v2(a)+v3(b) may lie anywhere
in the interval (v1(ab)− z, v1(ab) + z] which would not guarantee better than an z-
approximation of the welfare by choosing to assign the bundle ab to bidder 1. Thus
with inquiries in the auction, then the final assignment does not α-approximate the
welfare from an efficient assignment for each profile from v1×V2×· · ·×Vn. Inquiries
30With 3 valuations, it is possible by setting the price at the middle valuation since bidders are
reporting the entire demand set.
31Note that the proof would not work if bidder 1’s valuation function were known ex ante.
Otherwise, we could build an auction where the price of bidder 1 for the bundle ab is set initially
very high which does not violate minimality since at the null price bidder 1 may receive no items at
the supply set of the seller then the complete preferences of the remaining bidders can be revealed
by continuously rising the prices up to the valuation without violating minimality since the supply
set is reduced to the assignment where the bundle ab is assigned to bidder 1. More generally, a
formulation of the impossibility result in proposition 5.2 as under proposition 6.1 or the impossibility
result of de Vries et al [14] where the valuation function of the bidder who fails to satisfy the gross
substitutes condition is known ex ante does not hold.
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on bidders 2’s preferences thus take the form of a shift on the prices pt2,a and pt2,ab,
more precisely on the minimum of those two prices since it is this minimum that
matters for reporting either the null assignment as ones’s demand set or a non-
null demand set. We show that the very first inquiry (which exists) may create an
inefficiency that is strictly greater than z/2 which will prove the result. Without loss
of generality consider that this is a inquiry for bidder 2 (our argument works exactly
in the same way for bidder 3 with respect to inquiries on min {pt3,a, pt3,ab} which
completes the proof). The first inquiry takes the form of a price vector such that
min {pt2,a, pt2,ab} ∈ (v1(a), v1(a)+v1(b)+ z) (otherwise the demand set is known). For
some valuation realizations, we have v2(ab) = v2(a) < min {pt2,a, pt2,ab} and v3(ab) =
v3(b) = v1(a)+v1(b)+z such that the demand set is null for bidder 2 and would be null
forever given the ascending nature of the auction and thus in the final assignment of a
standard ascending auction bidder 2 receives no item such that the welfare difference
between the final assignment and the efficient one is greater than α.
J Proof of proposition 6.2
Before entering the proof itself, we introduce additional notation and preliminary
results.
For any round t, consider the modified valuation profile vt defined in the following
way: if ∅ ∈ Di(pt; v), then vti,H = pti,H for any H ⊆ G; otherwise vti,H = pti,H + kti for
H such that pti,H > 0 and vti,H = vi,H for H such that pti,H = 0. Note that for any
H ∈ Di(pt; v), we have vti,H = vi,H . First the definition of vt guarantees that pt is
semi-truthful according to the valuation profile vt. Second, from lemma 2.1, we have
vti,H ∈ [vi,H , vi,H + ) for any i ∈ N and H ⊆ G with pti,H > 0. In any other case, we
have vti,H = vi,H .
Then we define the set of bidder-Core payoffs, denoted by bCore(N , v):
bCore(N , v) =
(γ̂i)i∈N ≥ 0 | (∀S ⊆ N ) ∑
i∈N\S
γ̂ti ≤ w(N )− w(S)
 .
We define also bCore(N , v)+λ =
{
(γ̂i)i∈N ≥ 0 | ∀S ⊆ N ,
∑
i∈N\S γ̂
t
i ≤ w(N )− w(S) + λ
}
for any scalar λ.
In the same way as for the Core, we consider also the bidder-optimal frontier
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and the weak bidder-optimal frontier of the bidder-Core denoted respectively by
bBOCE(N , v) and bwBOCE(N , v).
Lemma J.1 For any QCE-invariant auction with -increments and with -discounts,
at any round t, we have:
(bCore(N , v)−N) ⊆ bCore(N , vt) ⊆ (bCore(N , v) +N). (2)
Furthermore, any γ ∈ (bCore(N , v) + λ) \ (bCore(N , v)− λ) λ-approximates the
set bwCore(N , v) for any scalar λ ≥ 0.
Proof For any round t, any i ∈ N and H ⊆ G, we have vti,H ∈ [vi,H , vi,H + ).
We obtain thus the inequalities:
w(N ; v)− w(S; v)−N ≤ w(N ; vt)− w(S; vt) ≤ w(N ; v)− w(S; v) +N. (3)
Consider γ ≥ 0 such that γ /∈ bCore(N , vt). Then there exists S ⊆ N such
that
∑
i∈N\S γi > w(N ; vt)−w(S; vt) and then we obtain from (3) that
∑
i∈N\S γi >
w(N ; v) − w(S; v) − N and finally that γ /∈ (bCore(N , v) − N). Consider γ ≥ 0
such that γ ∈ bCore(N , vt). Then we have ∑i∈N\S γi ≤ w(N ; vt)−w(S; vt) for any
S ⊆ N and then we obtain from (3) that ∑i∈N\S γi ≤ w(N ; v)− w(S; v) +N and
finally that γ ∈ (bCore(N , v) +N). On the whole we have shown the inclusions in
(2). We now move to the second part of the lemma.
Take γ ∈ (bCore(N , v))\(bCore(N , v)−λ). Let δ = minS(N {w(N )−w(S)−
P
i∈N\S γi
N−|S| }.
Since γ ∈ bCore(N , v), we have δ ≥ 0. Furthermore, since γ /∈ (bCore(N , v) − λ),
there exists a set S ⊆ N such that ∑i∈N\S γi > w(N ) − w(S) − λ. We obtain
thus that δ ≤ λ
N−|S| ≤ λ. Consider then the bidder-payoff vector γ∗ ≥ 0 such
that γ∗i = γi + δ for any i ∈ N . The construction guarantees that
∑
i∈N\S γ
∗
i ≤
w(N ) − w(S) for any S ⊆ N while the inequality stands as an equality for any
S ∈ ArgminS(N {w(N )−w(S)−
P
i∈N\S γi
N−|S| }. Thus γ∗ belongs to the set bwCore(N , v).
Since 0 ≤ δ ≤ λ, we have |γ∗i −γi| ≤ λ and we have thus shown that the bidder-payoff
vector γ λ-approximates the set bwCore(N , v).
A similar construction shows that any bidder-payoff γ ∈ (bCore(N , v) + λ) \
(bCore(N , v)) λ-approximates the set bwCore(N , v).
We conclude the proof after noting that (bCore(N , v)+λ)\ (bCore(N , v)−λ) =
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(bCore(N , v)) \ (bCore(N , v)− λ) ∪ (bCore(N , v) + λ) \ (bCore(N , v)) which holds
since (bCore(N , v)− λ) ⊆ bCore(N , v) ⊆ (bCore(N , v) + λ). CQFD
We now enter into the proof itself.
Let pT the pseudo-CE where the auction stops before the discount stage and
AT ∈ LN (pT ). From remark 6.1, we obtain that pT is a CE with respect to the
valuation profile vT since prices are remaining semi-truthful at any round t according
to the modified valuation profile vt. CE assignments are efficient and we have so
AT ∈ ArgmaxA∈A
∑
i∈N v
T
i,Ai . As noted above, we have also that v
T
i,H ∈ [vi,H , vi,H+]
for any i ∈ N and H ⊆ G. Let A∗ ∈ ArgmaxA∈A
∑
i∈N vi,Ai . We have thus:
∑
i∈N
vi,A∗i ≥
∑
i∈N
vi,ATi −N ·  ≥
∑
i∈N
vi,A∗i −N · .
Remember that for any H ∈ Di(pT ; v), we have vTi,H = vi,H . We have thus
vT
i,ATi
= vi,ATi and we conclude finally that the final assignmentAT [N ·]-approximates
the welfare from an efficient assignment as A∗.
In the same way as in the proof of proposition 4.2 in appendix E, note that the
auction dynamic stops if and only if pt is a CE with regards to the valuation profile
vt.
On the one hand, the bidder-payoff dynamic can not stop at round T at a vector
γ ≥ 0 such that γ /∈ (bCore(N , v) + N). Otherwise we obtain from lemma J.1
γ /∈ bCore(N , vT ) which raises a contradiction. In particular, this means that, at
round T , we have:
kTi ≤ (w(N )− w(N \ {i}) +N · . (4)
On the other hand, with a similar argument as in appendix E, the bidder-payoff
dynamic can not stop at round T at a vector γ ∈ (bCore(N , v)−(N+1)). Otherwise
it would mean that the algorithm has not stopped at a vector γ′ ∈ (bCore(N , v)−N)
at some round t. From lemma J.1, this latter condition implies that γ′ /∈ bCore(N , vt)
which raises a contradiction.
On the whole we obtain that the final bidder-payoff vector (kTi )i∈N ∈ (bCore(N , v)+
(N+1))\(bCore(N , v)−(N+1)) and thus from lemma J.1, it (N+1)-approximates
the set bwCore(N , v).
We now prove the last part of the proposition. Suppose now that bidders are
substitutes.
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Suppose by contradiction that by monotonicity of the price adjustment process,
there exists a round t and a bidder l ∈ N such that kt−1i ≥ w(N)−w(N \ {i})−N
and kti < w(N) − w(N \ {i}) − N. Since bidder i sees a price increase at period
t− 1, there exists A ∈ LN (pt−1) such that pti,Ai = 0. There exists thus A ∈ LN (pt−1)
such that Ai = ∅. Let M = {j ∈ N : Aj 6= ∅}. Let Â be an assignment yielding
value w(M ∪ {i}). Â is chosen such that Âj = ∅ if j /∈M ∪ {i}. Let M ′ = {j ∈ N :
Âj 6= ∅} ⊆M ∪ {i}.
∑
j∈M
pt
j,Aj =
∑
j∈M
vt
j,Aj − ktj
≤
∑
j∈M
(vj,Aj − ktj + )
≤ w(M)−
∑
j∈M
ktj + |M |
≤ w(M)−
∑
j∈M
ktj +N [M ⊆ N \ {i}]
< w(M)−
∑
j∈M
ktj + (w(N)− w(N \ {i})− kti) [induction assumption]
≤ w(M)−
∑
j∈M∪{i}
ktj + (w(M ∪ {i})− w(M)) [bidders are substitutes]
=
∑
j∈M ′
vj, bAj −
∑
j∈M∪{i}
ktj
≤
∑
j∈M ′
vj, bAj −
∑
j∈M ′
ktj [k
t
j ≥ 0 and M ′ ⊆M ∪ {i}]
≤
∑
j∈M ′
pt
j, bAj [lemma 2.1].
We have established that
∑
j∈M p
t
j,Aj <
∑
j∈M ′ p
t
j, bAj and thus raised a contra-
diction with A ∈ LN (pt−1) and thus proved that kT , the final payoff outcome once
the algorithm stops, satisfies kTi ≥ γVi − N ·  for any i ∈ N . From (4), we have
kTi ≤ γVi +N · . On the whole we obtain that kT [N · ]-approximates the Vickrey
payoff γV . Finally after the  discounts, the final bidder-payoff vector kT [(N+1) ·]-
approximates the Vickrey payoff γV .
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